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ABSTRACT 
 
BRITISH POLICY TOWARDS CYPRUS 
AND THE CYPRUS QUESTION 
1878-2005 
 
Şar, Celal 
 
M.A., Department of International Relations 
Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Dr. Hasan Ünal 
 
September 2005 
 
This master’s thesis aims to analyze British policy towards Cyprus and the 
Cyprus question in the period of 1878 to 2005. British policy towards Cyprus is 
mainly for military aspects. Cyprus has an importance for Britain, as it has SBAs in 
the island especially for intelligence, communication. British policy is directed more 
towards the external circumstances than the internal affairs in Cyprus, such as 
considering Soviet threat. Britain also considers its role in the UN and EU. 
The most important international organizations such as EU and UN continue 
to be involved with the Cyprus Question. Britain, as a former colonial power in 
Cyprus continues its policy towards Cyprus in the UN and US with the aim of not 
losing its military sovereignty over any solution appropriate for the other states. 
 
Keywords: Britain, Cyprus, RoC , SBAs, UNFCYP, UN, EU 
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ÖZET 
 
ĐNGĐLTERE’NĐN KIBRIS POLITIKASI 
VE KIBRIS SORUNU 
1878-2005 
 
Şar, Celal 
Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası Đlişkiler Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Dç.Dr. Hasan Ünal 
 
Eylül 2005 
 
Bu tezin amacı, Đngiltere’nin Kıbrıs politikası ve Kıbrıs sorununu 1878-2005 
dönemi kapsamında incelemektir. Đngilterenin politikasında Kıbrısın önemi askeri 
yönde olmuştur. Đngiltere’nin Kıbrıs’ta istihbarat ve iletişim amacı taşıyan kendi 
egemenliğinde bulunan Askeri Üsleri bulunmaktadır. Đngiltere’nin politikası, 
Kıbrısın iç politikasından daha çok, Sovyet tehdidi gibi bölgesel ağırlıklı olmaktadır. 
Ayrıca, Đngiltere’nin BM ve AB içindeki rolleri, Đngiltere’yi etkilemiştir. 
BM ve AB Kıbrıs sorununu ele almaya devam etmektedir. Bu bağlamda, 
Đngiltere’nin Kıbrıs politikası ağırlıklı olarak Kıbrıs’taki askeri varlığını, taraflar için 
uygun olacak herhangi bir çözümde devam ettirebilmek yönündedir. 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Đngiltere, Kıbrıs, Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti, Đngiliz Üsleri, BM Barışı 
Koruma Gücü, BM, AB 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The Ottoman Empire had sovereignty over Cyprus during the years 1571-
1878. When the Ottoman Empire was in World War I (1914-1918), Britain annexed 
Cyprus. But although the Ottoman Empire demanded the return of Cyprus after 
Russia evacuated Ottoman territories, Britain rejected it. 1 
After several years, Greek–Cypriots began requesting for enosis which meant 
annexation with Greece. Though the request claim was denied, the attempt to further 
its cause did not cease. Due to British authority over the land, Cypriots had to follow 
several rules and provisions of the British government such as the Lausanne Treaty. 
This brought more riots and uprisings from Greek–Cypriots but only to end up with a 
more repressive regime.  
During the 1950s, the Cypriots’ call for independence increased. Enosis 
developed and EOKA, an underground organization that attacked the British 
administration, emerged. Even Turkish–Cypriots started advocating for taksim or 
partition of the island for their own security. 
Due to such strong, even forceful, petitions for two differing interests, Britain 
resorted to taking its hands off Cyprus. However, two areas remained under their 
sovereignty to serve their interests in the Mediterranean. The London–Zurich 
Agreement brought Cyprus its independence- but neither enosis nor taksim-, and 
                                                 
1
 The 1931 Uprising, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, http://www.trncgov.com/history_8.htm 
  
 
 
2 
gave Britain the area of Akrotiri and Dhekelia. British army had two tasks in Cyprus; 
in the SBAs and in the UNFICYP. 
The RoC, along with its Constitution, was established but Britain ensured that 
it still has control over the island. A few months after Cyprus’ independence, it 
became a member of the UN. 
Though the establishment of the Cyprus Republic was primarily grounded on 
the goal of achieving a bi-communal relation between the two distinct ethnic 
communities, governing the island in a federal set-up turned out to be complicated 
for the two Cypriot communities. Various proposals existed to revise the 
Constitution including the Thirteen Points of Makarios and the Akritas Plan. Due to 
some assaults on the British people in Cyprus, Britain, with the help of the USA, 
passed several plans to Turkish–Cypriots and Greek–Cypriots but to no avail. In 
August 1975, an agreement between the representatives of the two Cypriot 
communities was reached for the regrouping of the Cyprus population with the 
Turkish zone in the north as TRNC and the Greek zone in the south. The situation 
worsened after Greek–Cypriots made an illegitimate unilateral application for 
membership of the European Union (EU) in 1990. In 2002, the Annan Plan was the 
latest proposal for a solution to this Cyprus problem. It has a power-sharing 
mechanism similar to that of the 1960s arrangement but only with a bi-communal 
set-up.  
After the Cold War, the significance of Cyprus as Britain’s strategic military 
base was lessened. However, it was heightened again when the Western war against 
terrorism was aroused. This time USA emerged more in the picture when the USA–
Britain Agreement was signed, along with other participating countries. Military 
facilities and intelligence units were installed in certain strategic areas in Cyprus to 
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be able to monitor military developments and activities in the Eastern Mediterranean 
and Middle East. 
In May 1, 2004, Cyprus entered the European Union as a divided island.2 In 
fact, this was formal accession of Southern Cyprus but the name used was the RoC. 
Initially, the Greek–Cypriot government claimed recognition as the lawful 
RoC and has been treated in this way since 1964 leaving Turkish–Cypriots excluded 
from all diplomatic relations.  
The international environment ignored to recognize the equal status of 
Turkish–Cypriots as co-founders of the Cyprus Republic but Cyprus is the common 
home of Turkish–Cypriots and of Greek–Cypriots. Accession of the TRNC was 
almost not being considered.  
But if the TRNC’s claim and right for recognition of the state quality of the 
applicant republic is upheld and accepted, in that case an agreement must cover 
either the formation of a state of “Cyprus” composed of both communities which are 
TRNC and Southern Cyprus. As a result, an isolated accession of the Southern 
Cyprus to EU was considered.3  
As a solution method for the Cyprus Question, it can be said as a beginning 
that both parties should loosen up their inflexible and decisive stance in which they 
are illegal according to a jointly accepted system of law; if they want to secure a 
peaceful, agreeable and equal resolution of the crisis. For a solution, a jointly 
accepted system of law is crucial. 
                                                 
2
 Suvarierol, Semin, The Cyprus Obstacle on Turkey’s Road to Membership in the European Union, 
Turkey and the European Union, Turkish Studies, Volume 4, Number 1 (Spring 2003), p.72-75 
3
 The Annan Plan: A Model of Governance in Multiethnic Society (September 11, 2004), Fifth Pan-
European International Relations Conference,  
http://www.sgir.org/conference2004/papers/Sozen%20-%20The%20Annan%20plan.pdf 
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In the solutions of the Cyprus Question, all Greek–Cypriot and Turkish–
Cypriot forces would be dissolved as a way of demilitarizing Cyprus but not 
including Britain’s full sovereign bases.  
Cyprus is Britain’s base for its power in the Eastern Mediterranean and 
Middle East with its SBAs. For instance, Britain moved to Cyprus after the loss of 
their military bases in Suez to Egypt and stored nuclear bombs on Cyprus.  
Finally, absolute peace in all aspects in Cyprus seems to be faraway or 
nonexistent to happen in short-term, but Cyprus’ importance for Britain continues 
with little changes. Main themes of British policy on Cyprus have not changed 
radically. But it sometimes showed little differences. It is not expected to change 
radically in the near future.  
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CHAPTER II 
BRITISH CONTROL ON CYPRUS: 1878 TO 1950 
2.1. British Rule on Cyprus 
The Ottoman Empire annexed Cyprus in August 7th, 1571 and had 
sovereignty over the island until 1878. After the 1877-1878 Ottoman–Russian War, 
British policy towards Ottoman government changed and supported the break-up of 
the Ottoman Empire. Invading Cyprus would be a step towards this aim.4  
The Ottomans being forced to sign a devastating peace treaty in 1878 known 
as the San Stephano under Russian dictation, the British came up with a suggestion 
of controlling Cyprus for a period of ninety nine years in return for the British 
protection of the Ottoman Empire against further Russian encroachment. The 
Ottomans had no alternative than to accept the British offer.5 On June 4, 1878 the 
Ottoman Empire and Britain signed an agreement, and Ottoman Empire consented to 
assign Cyprus to be controlled and administrated by Britain.6 Britain would support 
the Ottoman Empire against the Russian aggression until the provinces of Kars, 
Ardahan and other territories occupied by Russia during the war would be 
surrendered.7 
                                                 
4
 Ertekün, N.Münir, The Cyprus Dispute and The Birth of The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, 
University Press, Oxford, 1984, p.1 
5
 Ünal, Hasan, The Cyprus Question and The EU: The Annan Document and Latest Developments, 
Stradigma, E-Journal of Strategy and Analysis, 
http://www.stradigma.com/english/april2003/articles_06.html 
6
 Ertekün, N.Münir, The Cyprus Dispute and The Birth of The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, 
University Press, Oxford, 1984, p.1 
7
 Erim, Prof. Dr. Nihat, Devletlerarası Hukuku ve Siyasi Tarih Metinleri (Osmanlı Đmparatorluğu 
Antlaşmaları), Ankara Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Publication, Ankara, 1953, V.I. 
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The British presence in Cyprus though was only provisional as stipulated in 
the Convention of Defensive Alliance signed in 1878. According to it, if Russia 
restored to the Ottoman Empire the provinces of Kars, Ardahan and other territories 
in Eastern Anatolia during the war, Britain would have evacuated Cyprus and the 
Convention of Defensive Alliance would be terminated.8 
When the Ottoman Empire joined Germany and the Austro–Hungarian 
Empire in World War I (1914-1918), Britain unilaterally annexed Cyprus. When war 
was declared between the Ottoman Empire and Britain, it formally annexed Cyprus 
on November 5th, 1914.9 Moreover, when the Ottoman Empire demanded the return 
of Cyprus after Russia evacuated Ottoman territories, Britain rejected it.10  
In 1915 Britain offered the island to Greece to induce it to enter the war on its 
side, but Greece declined.11 In addition, through a Royal Decree signed on November 
27, 1917, Britain also requested the islanders to opt for British citizenship. Turkish–
Cypriots who preferred to save their Ottoman citizenship were treated as enemy 
aliens. The onslaught of the Turkish community by Greek–Cypriots thus intensified 
and the situation resulted in the emigration of Turkish–Cypriots to Anatolia as they 
were suffering economic and administrative discrimination.12  
                                                 
8
 The Cyprus Problem, Turkish Embassy, 
http://www.turkishembassy.org.au/makale/cyprusproblem.htm 
9
 Oberling, Pierre, The Road to Bellapais, The Turkish Cypriot Exodus to Northern Cyprus, Columbia 
University Press, New York, 1982, p.29 
10
 The 1931 Uprising, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, http://www.trncgov.com/history_8.htm 
11
 Solsten, Eric, Cyprus, British Annexation, 
http://workmall.com/wfb2001/cyprus/cyprus_history_british_annexation.html 
12
 The 1931 Uprising, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, http://www.trncgov.com/history_8.htm. 
  
 
 
7 
2.2. The Early Call for Enosis  
Greek–Cypriots waged an early uprising for enosis13 after British took over in 
1879.14 The petition though was sympathetically received, and denied. However, 
attempts to further the cause did not cease. 
Greek–Cypriots’ demand to unite with their so-called motherland Greece was 
ignited by the Greek rebellion against the Ottoman government in 1821, as a result of 
which an independent Greek Kingdom was established. The idea of enosis at first 
was confined within a small-educated segment of the society.15 As trade prospered, 
Cyprus economy grew and more Greek–Cypriots were able to study in Athens. As 
time went by, the wish to unite Cyprus with Greece spread through Greek–Cypriots 
and it gained more supporters.  
Greek–Cypriots were not contented with the British rule and they preferred to 
be united with Greece. However, the presence of Turkish–Cypriots on the island 
posed a major obstacle for them to assert enosis. The Turkish–Cypriot community 
was naturally against the idea of becoming a minority under Greek rule. Fearing 
colonization by Greece, Turkish–Cypriots cooperated with the British administration 
on the island. Except for a few, the British used Turkish–Cypriots in the 
administration of the island as a counterweight in the institutions against Greek–
Cypriots who were demanding enosis.16 However, as the activities for enosis 
strengthened, some resorted to violence to advance their objective and the Turkish–
Cypriot community was consequently subjected to an onslaught by Greek–Cypriots. 
As Turkish–Cypriots were lesser in number and were widely dispersed across the 
island; it was easier for Greek–Cypriots to intimidate them. They were driven out of 
                                                 
13
 Greek word for ‘union’ or ‘the political union of Cyprus with Greece’ 
14
 First Years (1878 - 1879) of the English Administration,  
http://www.kibris.gen.tr/english/beginproblem/beginproblem_sover_rent01.html 
15
 Ibid. 
16
 Ibid. 
  
 
 
8 
mixed villages and were deprived of land and homes. The attacks resulted in the 
general impoverishment of the Turkish–Cypriot community.  
2.3. Lausanne Treaty 
Under the terms of the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne-Article 23-, both Turkey and 
Greece recognized that Cyprus was under British sovereignty. Nonetheless, the 
Greek Orthodox Church in Cyprus continued to strengthen its activities for enosis. 
To appease them, Britain kept a presence of Greek–Cypriots in the government when 
Cyprus was declared as a British colony in 1925.  
Cyprus became a British naval base. In 1878, Prime Minister of Britain at that 
time intended to take the island as a base to support the Ottoman Empire against 
Russian attacks. In November 5, 1915, Britain announced the annexation of Cyprus. 
Although the Ottoman Empire did not assert to this illegal action by Britain, the 
Ankara government, which was the new Turkish regime, accepted it in July 1923 in 
Lausanne.  
This was one of their actions to be able to strengthen its rule in Cyprus. 
According to Article 21 of the Lausanne Treaty, Turkish–Cypriots were given two 
years to choose between British or Turkish citizenship. If an individual Turkish–
Cypriot chose to be a Turkish citizen; he or she had to leave Cyprus within a year of 
the choosing.  
Some Turkish–Cypriots chose to be Turkish citizens and some chose to 
remain on the island. Because of this, the number of Turkish–Cypriots in Cyprus 
declined. This had changed the lives of Turkish–Cypriots who remained on the 
island. After a number of Turkish–Cypriots left the island, their population decreased 
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as time went by, and Greek–Cypriots increased at the same time. Due to this, Greek–
Cypriots had an easy time terrorizing the Turkish population in Cyprus.17  
2.4. The 1931 Greek–Cypriot Revolt and the 1930-1950 Period 
Despite British efforts to prevent uprising, Greek–Cypriots launched riots and 
revolted against the British government in 1931. The government however was able 
to suppress the rebellion. It banned all political parties and abolished the legislative 
council. The constitution was withdrawn and a repressive regime took over and 
remained in force until the early 1940s. The emergency measures implemented after 
the Greek revolt included prohibitions on the importation of books from Turkey and 
Greece, on the flying of both Turkish and Greek flags.18 These are of the British 
attempt to limit and reduce the influence of Turkey and Greece on the Turkish–
Cypriot and Greek–Cypriot communities. Britain realized that the more connected 
the communities to their respective motherlands were, the stronger their inclination 
to identify with them and the greater the tendency for the communities to resist 
foreign rule which was British rule would be. 
On the other hand, Greek–Cypriots demands for enosis were strengthening. 
Cypriot communists founded AKEL as the successor to an earlier communist party 
that had been established in the 1920s and proscribed during the 1930s.19 
Greek–Cypriot activities for enosis intensified again shortly after World War 
II ended in 1945, and tension began to rise in Cyprus once more. On February 28, 
1947, the Greek parliament unanimously passed a resolution approving enosis. The 
resolution was as follows: “The time has come for the settlement of the sacred 
national claim of the union of Cyprus to Greece. The Greek National Assembly 
                                                 
17
 The 1931 Uprising, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, http://www.trncgov.com/history_8.htm 
18
 Ibid.  
19
 Solsten, Eric, Cyprus, World War II and Postwar Nationalism, 
http://workmall.com/wfb2001/cyprus/cyprus_history_world_war_ii_and_postwar_nationalism.html 
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appeals to the noble and gallant people of Britain, expressing the conviction that this 
claim will be fully satisfied.”20  
In 1946 Britain proposed constitutional changes leading to self-government 
on Cyprus. The appointed Governor of Cyprus, Winster, gathered a Consultative 
Assembly of leading Cypriot representatives to carry out a new constitution based on 
self-rule. Turkish–Cypriots and left wing Greek–Cypriot representatives agreed to 
participate in the Consultative Assembly. However, the Assembly was indefinitely 
adjourned and later on dissolved after the Greek–Cypriot representatives renewed 
their objections and withdrew from the Assembly on May 20, 1948. The chance to 
develop the initial stages for independence was thus missed.21 
 
                                                 
20
 Ibid. 
21
 The 1931 Uprising, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, http://www.trncgov.com/history_8.htm 
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CHAPTER III 
BRITISH POLICY FROM 1950 TO 1960 
3.1. EOKA and Enosis 
The so-called Greek “great idea” (megale idea) aiming at recreating the 
Byzantine Empire is connected with the Cyprus problem. After the annihilation of 
the Turkish–Cypriot community, annexation of the island to Greece was planned.22 
Under British colonial rule (1878–1959), Greek–Cypriots began agitation for enosis 
a demand that alienated their Turkish–Cypriot neighbors.23 According to Turkish–
Cypriots’ claim, control of Cyprus should simply revert to Turkey in the event of 
British withdrawal, unless Turkey signed the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne but only in 
favor of Britain.24 
After plebiscite results held on 25 March 1921 in Cyprus and a petition for 
enosis, the plea for enosis was put into as a national policy of Greece. Greek politics 
had a radicalization and it can be seen from the statements of former Greek Defense 
and Foreign Minister Evangelos Averoff who said concerning Cyprus: ‘We are going 
to continue to back enosis wherever Greeks exist. The Greeks in Istanbul are very 
important for us. The Greeks have their wealth in the churches and other 
                                                 
22
 The Cyprus Problem, Turkish Embassy, 
http://www.turkishembassy.org.au/makale/cyprusproblem.htm 
23
 Bryant, Rebecca, Justice or respect? A comparative perspective on politics in Cyprus, Ethnic and 
Racial Studies, Volume 24, Number 6 (November 1, 2001),  p.893 
24
 Solsten, Eric, Cyprus World War II and Postwar Nationalism, 
http://workmall.com/wfb2001/cyprus/cyprus_history_world_war_ii_and_postwar_nationalism.html 
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organizations there. For this reason we have to back enosis’.25 Greek violence 
increased against the British and Turkish–Cypriots in the early 1950s.  
The plebiscite results were also presented to the UN with a self-determination 
request for only Greek–Cypriots. Makarios, who became later the first president of 
the RoC, tried to denounce British policy before the UN in February 1951; but 
Britain held that Cyprus question was an internal affair and was not subject to UN 
consideration.26 As a result, Greek–Cypriots decided to resort to violence to achieve 
enosis. Greek–Cypriots began forming secret subversive organizations. 
In the 1950s, the enosis activities grew and accelerated under the control and 
provocation of Makarios. He took an oath that he would achieve enosis before his 
death. The pressure of Greek–Cypriots on the British government to permit enosis 
increased even more. Makarios led the political and military efforts to achieve enosis 
through providing the British for repression. Also, Greece made several attempts to 
utilize the UN as a means of self-determination and enosis.27 Britain decided after the 
increased Greek-violence that the UN should take the matter in its hands. To the 
disappointment of the Greeks, the UN rejected the union of Cyprus with Greece.  
A second anti-British organiozation, EOKA (Ethniki Organosis Kyprion 
Aghoniston), National Organization of Cypriot Fighters, was a group using guerrilla-
techniques that desired political union, or enosis, with Greece. 
It had effects on the island’s gaining independence from Britain.28 Makarios 
had invited Cypriot-born retired Greek army Colonel Georgios Grivas to form the 
                                                 
25
 Sabahattin Ismail, Kıbrıs’ta Yunan Sorunu (1821–2000) (The Greek Question in Cyprus 1821–
2000), Istanbul: Akdeniz Publications, 2000, p. 72. 
26
 Solsten, Eric, Cyprus World War II and Postwar Nationalism, 
http://workmall.com/wfb2001/cyprus/cyprus_history_world_war_ii_and_postwar_nationalism.html 
27
 Ertekün, N.Münir, The Cyprus Dispute and The Birth of The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, 
University Press, Oxford, 1984, p.3 
28
 Background Note: Cyprus, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, December 2004,p.127,  
http://www.er.cna.it/biblioteca/files/200505140135212005051401357337Paesi_Lettera_C_pdf7351.p
df 
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Greek Cypriot youth organization PEON,29 later the EOKA as the military arm of 
enosis in 1951.30 EOKA’s communist commander, George Grivas who learned the 
techniques of guerrilla war,31 aimed terrorist attacks mostly at the British army. With 
this aim, proving his attention being enosis,32 five years of terrorist activities were 
executed beginning from 1954 and 1955. On April 1, 1955, EOKA opened a 
campaign of violence against British rule in a well-coordinated series of attacks on 
police, military, and other government installations in Nicosia, Famagusta, Larnaca, 
and Limassol. Grivas circulated his first proclamation as leader of EOKA, and the 
four-year terrorist struggle was launched.33  
In 1955, EOKA started island-wide acts of violence and sabotage against 
British rule.34 The demand of enosis eventually resulted in an armed rebellion (1955–
1959) led by EOKA. This exclusively Greek–Cypriot guerilla organization was 
opposed not only by the British government but also by Turkish–Cypriots, many of 
whom supported the British forces or otherwise had to provide their security 
themselves against EOKA.35  
According to Turkish–Cypriots, enosis was ‘a change of Colonial Masters for 
the worse’ or simply meant ‘slavery’. Greece’s acquisition of the Dodecanese Islands 
in 1947 was a threat for Turkish–Cypriots.  Turkish–Cypriots had two alternatives: 
(1) ‘slavery’ or (2) ‘struggle and never consent enosis’, which was a sufficient reason 
                                                 
29
 Pancypria Elliniki Organosis Neoleas (Pancyprian Greek Youth Organization) 
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for being killed by the ‘New Colonial Masters’.36 But EOKA first had to erode the 
British government. 
Turkey encouraged Turkish–Cypriots to opt for Turkish nationality. Cyprus 
was strategically vital for Turkey and when the danger of uniting Cyprus with Greece 
had reached to an alarming level, Turkey raised its voice to protect the Turkish–
Cypriot community and its vital national interests.37  
On the island a political organization, which also knew guerrilla techniques, 
called Volkan, was formed to defend Turkish–Cypriots’ rights and interests after its 
former organization which was Turkish Resistance Organization-Türk Mukavemet 
Teşkilâtı(TMT)- was established in 1957.38 
During the terror of Greek–Cypriot’s cause for enosis, Britain wanted to keep 
their hold of Cyprus as base to protect the Suez Canal.39 Several conferences and 
meetings among Turks, Greeks and British contingencies were held to be able to 
pacify the riots and uprisings of the terrorist actions of EOKA. In 1955, Britain 
attempted to focus on the dispute between the two communities and invited Turkey 
and Greece to discuss the future of Cyprus but the dispute continued. In this way, 
while the riots would not cease, British military forces increased rapidly in Cyprus to 
be able to control the activities applying terrorism. Makarios refused the British plan 
for gradual independence on February 02, 1956 and was exiled to Seychelles after a 
month due to his complicity with EOKA. When Makarios was exiled on the ground 
of enosis provocations, the reaction in Cyprus was so aggressive that a state of 
emergency was declared which caused EOKA propose a truce conditional on the 
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release of Makarios. At the same year, Turkey also rejected the British plan for 
enosis. 
Due to this persistent insistence, the negotiations were then transferred to the 
UN in 1957. The Assembly resulted in the formulation of Resolution 1013 which 
announced the principle of an independent Cyprus state40 but the resolution was far 
from what Greek–Cypriots were hopeful of. In June 1958, Britain proposed a seven-
year partnership scheme of separate communal legislative bodies and separate 
municipalities to maintain international status quo and to establish a representative 
self-government.41 Turkish and Greek governments and Makarios once again rejected 
the plan. In October, Britain modified the 1958 plan but still to no avail.  
In 1958, communal tension was increasing in Cyprus due to enosis aimed 
activities. During the first 10 days of April of the same year, more than 50 bombs 
have already been reported. The governor sent a message to Grivas to stop the 
bombing and to meet him in person unarmed and alone. Grivas refused the invitation 
to meet up personally with the governor but he ceased the sabotage temporarily.  
British administration feared its political condition with the intensity of 
EOKA’s aggressive activities and the resistance of the Turkish–Cypriot to enosis 
activities. Britain had to leave sovereignty over Cyprus to some extent.42 Cyprus 
gained its independence from Britain and established a constitutional republic in 
1960. In March 1961, Cyprus was admitted as member of the Commonwealth 
because Britain was eager to retain some influence on the strategically important 
island,43 and Britain retained sovereignty over its two military bases in the island.44 
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3.2. The Macmillan Plan 
Turkish civilians and their farms and houses were targeted. In order to halt 
the violence, the British introduced the Macmillan Plan.  
In fact the agreements consisted of international accords between Britain, 
Greece and Turkey designed to serve the interests of the three partners. Although the 
Greek side signed the agreements, it sought to sabotage them. They wanted to 
deprive the Turkish partners of any rights and thus it was Greek–Cypriots who 
caused most of the trouble in Cyprus.45  
3.2.1. The Root of the Macmillan Plan 
The British government felt that the Cyprus problem would only be solved 
through negotiations and not with military activities over enosis aimed activities. At 
the time when Makarios was released and Britain was ready to cease its sovereignty 
on Cyprus, a new civil governor was appointed to form a new atmosphere towards 
the end of the British rule over Cyprus. After the autumn of 1957, Britain’s political 
image was seen to be impartiality and liberality, accept for its interest on the military 
bases.46  
During the governorship of Hugh Foot in Cyprus after 1957, British Prime 
Minister Harold Macmillan revealed his belief that partition of the island of Cyprus 
would be the only way out of the problem. A Macmillan plan was prepared to 
“provide for the delineation of British military forces, where full British sovereignty 
would remain, while the rest of the island would be ruled by a ‘sovereignty’ of 
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Turkey, Greece and Britain in partnership.”47 He also declared the main purpose of 
the Macmillan plan, which was to achieve a status quo between the two communities 
in Cyprus, the Turkish and the Greek governments with the British bases and other 
installations for Britain’s military power seeming as the safeguarding for the 
problems in Cyprus. 
Thus, with this in mind, the Macmillan Plan was communicated to Ankara 
and Athens on June 10 of 1958.  
3.2.2. The Original Provisions of the Macmillan Plan 
The plan declares the participation and cooperation of both Turkey and 
Greece in an effort to achieve peace, prosperity and progress in Cyprus.  
Cyprus would also possess a system of representative government from the 
Turkish and the Greek communities which will provide each of them autonomy in its 
own communal affairs through its own House of Representatives. 48 The governance 
of the land of Cyprus will be centered on a Council composed of a governor from 
Britain, representatives of the Turkish and Greek governments, six Cypriot ministers, 
two Turkish representatives who will also be elected to power, four representatives 
of the Greek representative in the House who will be elected to power.49 The 
governor representing Cyprus will also have the power to ensure the protection of the 
interests of both Turkish and Greek communities. 50 This governor will also have the 
power to intervene with Cyprus in its external affairs, defense and internal security. 
The Turkish and Greek representatives will, in turn, can require any legislation 
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considered discriminatory to be passed to an impartial tribunal.51 The British 
government received all arrangements about Turkish–Cypriots and Greek–Cypriots 
and so they could keep their own nationality in the land except for the continuing 
administrative and security problems.52 
The plan also indicates that the international status, the British sovereignty 
most importantly, will not change for five to seven years.53  
3.2.3. The Alterations of the Macmillan Plan 
A number of Turkish and Greek oppositions to the plan lead to its revisions 
and alterations. Macmillan had to pattern the plan to be able to consent them. 
First opposition from Greek–Cypriots was due to the idea of having Turkish 
and Greek representatives in the Governor’s Council. Greek–Cypriots were not 
pleased of having a Turkish representative with them in the Council since as they 
believe, having a Turkish representative in the Council will admit Turkish presence 
on the island.54 The Greeks had considered Turkish–Cypriots as a minority in 
Cyprus. With this opposition, the plan was modified and released on August 15. 55  
The plan was viewed by the Labor opposition in Britain as more likely to 
divide Cyprus, rather than to place the two communities in union with each other.56 
The result of the Macmillan Plan in Cyprus was an increase in violence. Twelve days 
before the plan was announced, fire sabotage started in Nicosia and the two-month 
Turkish–Greek fight began wherein 56 Greeks and 53 Turks died. With this, more 
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British soldiers were sent to Cyprus to control the quarrel, increasing their number to 
20,000. 57 
The Greek government, upon modification of the plan, rejected it once again. 
With this, the Macmillan plan was revised. He asserted that the representatives of 
Turkey and Greece will not be any longer members of the Governor’s Council but 
will have direct access to the governor. Together with this, Macmillan visited 
Ankara, Cyprus and Athens to announce the revisions of the plan. 58 
Still, the revised plan was unacceptable to Southern Cyprus and to Greece. A 
few weeks later, the Turkish government accepted the plan and announced their 
cooperation with the British government in its implementation. On October 1, 1958 
Turkey appointed a representative in Cyprus. Even with the declination of the Greek 
government, the plan was implemented due to the British belief that if they do not 
implement the plan, Turks would turn away from the British side. 59  
Greece objected on Turkey acting in the controversy of any argument of its 
opponent. Also, Greece indicated that through the Lausanne Treaty, it has withdrawn 
its right on Cyprus. Ironically, enosis conflicts with the fact that Greece had already 
accepted British occupation under the same treaty. 
3.2.4. Implications of the Macmillan Plan 
The Macmillan Plan attracted Turkish–Cypriots because it returned them 
power and right over the island of Cyprus and also on its governance. It also gave 
them the influence in international relations and negotiations on Cyprus. For 
Turkish–Cypriots, not only did the plan postpone a decision for self-determination 
only for Greek–Cypriots - but also ensured Turkey a veto on enosis, which caused 
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aggressive activities against Turkish–Cypriots. No central government was made; 
therefore no Greek governance would be present in the island.60 
In Greek–Cypriot side respect, there would be no legislature that would be 
controlled by them since they overpopulate Cyprus compared to the Turkish–Cypriot 
community. 61 
The most important feature of the plan is that it formed separate communal 
assemblies between Turkish–Cypriots and Greek–Cypriots that the Turkish Cypriots 
view as a stepping-stone for taksim or partition for the security of themselves and a 
blockage towards enosis. 62 
The Greeks considered the Macmillan plan as the worst policy of Britain ever 
presented. Because of the implementation of the plan without considering the 
rejection of Greece, Greeks’ suspicions increased that the Turkish and the British 
governments were working against them. With this suspicion, EOKA-violence 
increased on August 21, 1958. EOKA members called for a boycott of the British 
government and of their goods, as a symbol of rejecting to so-called Turkish–British 
collusion. Months of violence that caused a threat for civil war between Turkish–
Cypriots and Greek–Cypriots, followed as well as the increasing resentment between 
Greek–Cypriots and the British. The violence did not only remain between Turkish–
Cypriots and Greek–Cypriots but Greek–Cypriots also started attacking British 
soldiers. 2000 Cypriots were under detention and many more were forbidden to leave 
their houses during daytime or nighttime. 63 
With Greek suspicion that the Macmillan Plan may lead the way to the 
partitioning of the island, Makarios told the Greek government that he was ready to 
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accept the independence of Cyprus under the UN auspices after a period of self-
determination for Greek–Cypriots.64  
3.3. The Zurich–London Treaty: The Three Agreements 
In February 11th, 1959, Zurich Agreements and in February 19th, 1959, 
London Agreements were signed between Turkey, Greece and Britain and were 
about the founding principles of the new republic in Cyprus. 
Talks among the major parties had begun in late 1958. The negotiations led to 
the Zurich and London Agreements that featured the creation of an independent 
Cypriot state. Under these agreements, Turkey and Greece decided that neither 
unilateral nor double enosis would be acceptable. It was also agreed that there would 
be bi-national independence, grounded on political equality and administrative 
partnership of the two Cypriot communities and that both would have full autonomy 
in their communal affairs. The Zurich and London Agreements were aimed at 
implementing a federal system in the Cyprus Republic that would eliminate 
discrimination and prevent inter-communal friction.65 
Along with the compromised settlement reached through the Zurich and 
London Agreements are three treaties designed to meet the desires and needs of 
Turkey, Greece and Britain. The Treaty of Guarantee affirms that Turkey, Greece 
and Britain guaranteed the transfer of sovereignty of the RoC to the two Cypriot 
communities. This treaty bans political or economic union of the republic with any 
foreign state and bans activities that would lead to such unions. The treaty’s 
signatories were pledged to uphold the “state of affairs” established by the 
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constitution.66 The Treaty of Guarantee also secures the territorial integrity and the 
constitutional order of the Cyprus Republic. According to the treaty, any violation of 
the territorial integrity and of the constitutional order would warrant the Guarantor 
powers of Turkey, Greece and Britain to intervene either together or, if not possible, 
unilaterally in order to maintain the territorial integrity and the constitutional order of 
the republic.67  
In accordance with the Zurich and London Agreements; Turkey, the RoC, 
and Greece entered a Treaty of Alliance that provided for the establishment of a 
Tripartite Headquarters and permitted the stationing of Turkish and Greek military 
contingents in the island.68 This treaty allowed Turkey and Greece to deploy 650 and 
950 military officers respectively.69  
Lastly, with the Treaty of Establishment, Britain controlled sovereignty over 
a territory on the island’s southern coast for two military bases.70  
3.4. The Treaty of Establishment  
According to the Treaty of Establishment, Britain retained sovereignty over 
about 256 square kilometers of territory, which consisted the Akrotiri and Dhekelia 
SBAs. Britain also retained certain access and communications routes.71  
After the evacuation of forces from the Suez Canal zone, the headquarters of 
the British Middle East Land and Air Forces had also moved to Cyprus.72  
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3.4.1. Why Britain gave upon Cyprus 
British policy required that putting the whole Cyprus under their control 
would give them more disadvantages than benefits. British government foresaw 
problems in maintaining full control of the island because of financial difficulties and 
their declining economy, and the Greek–Cypriots asking for their self-determination 
and freedom against the British control through both peaceful-seeming and also 
forceful means. But, British officials tried to take every opportunity in preserving 
influence in Cyprus to protect their interests in the region. The two SBAs , which had 
been planned by Britain to preserve their influence, were Akrotiri and Dhekelia. 
These two areas remain under British legal authority, in accordance to the Treaty of 
Establishment as well.73  
3.4.2. Keeping SBAs in 1960s 
Britain intended to keep these two bases under their control for mainly 
military but also some humanitarian reasons. Akrotiri and Dhekelia, which cover 98 
square miles that is an area a quarter the size of Hong Kong, “enable Britain to 
maintain a permanent military presence at a strategic point in the Eastern 
Mediterranean”.74 They are both strategic staging posts for British military aircrafts 
and communication facilities, which aid in Britain’s worldwide links.75  
As Britain resorted to releasing Cyprus and maintaining control on two areas 
in Cyprus, Treaty of Establishment was signed in Nicosia on August 16, 1960 by 
Turkey represented by Vecdi Türel, by the RoC represented by Fazıl Küçük, by 
Britain represented by Hugh Foot and by Greece represented by G. Christopoulos. 
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This was signed with the desire to give effect to the declaration made by the United 
Kingdom on February 17th, 1960 and in accordance to the Treaty of Alliance made 
by the Foreign Ministers of Turkey and Greece, by the Representative of the 
Turkish–Cypriot community and the Greek–Cypriot community.76  
The three treaties, the Treaty of Guarantee, the Treaty of Alliance, and the 
Treaty of Establishment, went into effect on the same day, in August 16th, 1960. 
3.4.3. Implications of the Treaty of Establishment 
The first article of the Treaty reiterated once again the SBAs, which remain 
under the British legal authority. The RoC covers the main island of Cyprus, along 
with the surrounding islands lying off its coast, but with the exception of the two 
areas that are the Akrotiri SBA and the Dhekelia SBA. The boundaries of the two 
SBAs77 that were marked by Britain is not anymore included as part of Cyprus’ 
territorial land. The waters surrounding the SBAs, as has been marked and agreed 
upon is also under the legal authority of Britain and not anymore included as part of 
Cyprus’ territorial sea.  
Because of the existence of SBAs under the British legal authority, the British 
army was sent to Cyprus to work to a tri-service headquarters and was fully tasked to 
protect the SBAs and other controlled sites in all costs. The army consists of “two 
resident infantry Battalions, the Joint Service Signals Unit at Ayios Nikolaos, 62 
Cyprus Support Squadron Royal Engineers and 16 Flight Army Air Corps (equipped 
with Gazelle helicopters) at Dhekelia. There are also a variety of supporting arms 
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such as the Royal Logistics Corps, Royal Army Medical Corps, Royal Electrical and 
Mechanical Engineers, Royal Military Police and others located in both SBAs.”78 
One analysis of the Treaty of Establishment means that the British 
government will keep important rights outside the areas under its legal authority in 
the RoC. The British government had rights such as unrestricted usage of additional 
small sites outside the areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia upon necessity, free use of 
roads, ports and other facilities for transportation between the two SBAs, continued 
usage of port facilities in Famagusta, use of public utilities, use of specified 
territories for troop training purposes; etc.79 This situation implies that even after 
Britain relinquishes sovereignty over the rest of Cyprus, Britain still maintained 
rights in the RoC, has territory which it retains under its full sovereignty substantial 
for its advantages in the Mediterranean areas.80  
This maintenance of British sovereignty over the two communities in Cyprus 
is also named as rather unusual arrangement. Foreign base rights in other countries 
can only be for a certain timeframe. Britain has maintained bases in several countries 
after ceasing control over them, but this is the only case where Britain has insisted on 
controlling base areas under its own legal authority.81 On the other hand, Henry 
Hopkinson, minister of state for the colonies infamous statement in July 1954 was 
that Cyprus as other certain territories in the Commonwealth, which, owing to their 
peculiar circumstances, “can never expect to be fully independent.” 82  
It can be said that having British bases in Cyprus provides few advantages for 
both parties but also, consequences in the future. One advantage is as the settlement 
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of these bases remained; “greater safeguard against the unilateral abolition of base 
rights by an unfriendly local government” has been constituted. However, the bad 
side of it is that it may also cause points of friction between the British and Cyprus 
governments in the future, particularly over such matters as access, maintenance of 
additional sites, customs problems and similar questions.83 
One example of friction is the aggressive attacks from Greek–Cypriots 
against the British soldiers residing in Akrotiri and Dhekelia, which did not end 
when Britain gave Cyprus its freedom. On July 4, 2001, Greek–Cypriots forced the 
groups of the British police in their military compound in Cyprus demanding for the 
release of a local member of the parliament who was arrested for trying to break into 
the British bases. 84  
On September 29, 2002, thousands of Greek–Cypriots attacked the British 
RAF communications base in Akrotiri in protest of their presence in the island and of 
the prospect of British installations being used against Iraq. This base in Akrotiri is 
one of the most valuable listening posts that give vital assistance to the USA-led 
intelligence in Iraq and Iran.85  
The relationship of Turkey, Greece, Britain and the two countries was 
unstable due to their desires and sometimes aggression against each other, which is 
named as the origin of the Cyprus problem. 
3.5. The Treaty of Guarantee  
First and foremost, the treaty, in its first article, indicates that the RoC would 
ensure the maintenance of its independence, territorial integrity and security. The 
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respect that should be given to its Constitution should also be guaranteed. The 
ensuring of the independence, most importantly, implies that “It undertakes not to 
participate, in whole or in part, in any political or economic union with any State 
whatsoever”.86  
With this, Turkey, Cyprus, Britain and Greece signed the Treaty of Guarantee 
on August 16, 1960 in Nicosia. Signatories for Turkey was V. Türel, for the RoC 
were Fazıl Küçük and O. Kyprou Makarios; for Greece C. Christopoulos; for Britain 
Hugh Foot.87 But, Greek–Cypriots were the ones using force of arms, destroying the 
Treaty and thus, trying to violate Turkish–Cypriots’ rights.88  
According to the second article, the three countries are given the 
responsibility to prohibit any activities, which aims to promote the union of Cyprus 
to any State or to the partition of the island.89  
The third article reiterates the rights of Britain that has been mentioned in the 
Treaty of Establishment. Here, Britain enforces Greece, the RoC and Turkey and to 
give respect to the integrity of the areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia as Britain 
properties at the time of the establishment of the RoC. With the signing of this treaty, 
the three countries guarantee, once again, the use and control by Britain of rights in 
Cyprus. 90 
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The fourth article establishes the responsibility of Greece, Turkey and Britain 
and if joint action among the three signatories is impossible, “the Treaty permits 
unilateral action to safeguard its provisions.”91  
One of the most important implications of the signing of the Treaty of 
Guarantee is Britain’s prohibition of both enosis and partition of Cyprus direct or 
indirect integration with Greece, integration with the European Union or with 
Turkey.92 
3.6. Treaty of Alliance 
The second article reiterates that Turkey, Greece and Britain were required to 
undertake resistance against any attack or aggression against the independence and 
territorial integrity of the island. 93  
The third article establishes a Tripartite Headquarters in the territory of the 
RoC in order to achieve the objectives of the first and second articles of this treaty. 94 
The fourth article mentions that Turkey and Greece will join this Tripartite 
Headquarters with the military contingents, which will provide for the training of the 
army of the RoC. 95 
The first additional protocol provides the Tripartite Headquarters with 650 
Turkish officers, non-commissioned officers and men, and 950 Greek officers, non-
commissioned officers and men. 96  
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3.7. The RoC 
In August 16th, 1960 was the proclamation of the independence of the new 
republic in Cyprus. The solution that was found in 1960 was not the preferred option 
of either the two communities, which were security, taksim or separation for 
Turkish–Cypriots; and self determination only for one side that was a code for enosis 
or union of the whole island with Greece for Greek–Cypriots.97  
The RoC was established after independence was proclaimed on August 16, 
1960. On the same year, Cyprus was admitted to the UN98 and to the Commonwealth 
of Nations.99 Independence was stipulated in a number of international treaties by the 
effects of Britain and no single power could have exclusive sovereignty of the island 
as a whole. A series of treaties among Turkey, Greece and Britain made the 
establishment of an independent Cyprus state possible. But in fact, this new state was 
not a fully independent one since other states than Cyprus, the guarantor powers, 
limited its independence to a certain extent.100 
According to the Zurich and London Agreement in 1959, the structure was 
described as a functional federation and not a unitary state, and the mechanism was 
reflected on all three branches of the republic: legislative, executive and judiciary.101 
The Zurich and London Agreements dictated the Basic Structure (BS) of the 
Republic. In terms of executive power, the republic is a presidential system with a 
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Greek–Cypriot as President and a Turkish–Cypriot for the Vice-President102. Both 
have powers to veto decisions of Council Members concerning defense, security and 
foreign affairs “except the participation of the RoC in international organisations and 
pacts of alliance in which Greece and Turkey both participate”.103 The government of 
the RoC included a Council of Ministers, “composed of seven Greek Ministers and 
three Turkish Ministers”.104 One of the three ministries among the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense or the Ministry of Finance would be entrusted 
to a Turkish–Cypriot105. 
The House of Representatives exercised the legislative power of the 
government and was in the proportion of 70 per cent for the Greek–Cypriots and 30 
per cent for the Turkish–Cypriots.106 The Constitutional Law except for its basic 
articles requires a separate two-thirds majorities to be modified.107  
The Supreme Constitutional Court108 and the High Court of Justice 109 made up 
the judiciary branch of the Republic. Each community had its own courts responsible 
for cases of purely communal matters.  
The ratio of 30 percent Turkish–Cypriots to 70 percent Greek–Cypriots was 
applied in Civil Service, the Security Forces, the Council of Ministers, the House of 
Representatives.110  
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3.8. Membership in the UN  
In March 4th, 1964, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 186, in order 
to maintain peace and putting an end to violence in Cyprus and stationed a force—
the UNFICYP.111 The 1,000-strong UNFICYP, consisting also British soldiers, 
served in Cyprus since 1964 and maintained the buffer zone between North and 
South.112 British soldiers in the island serve in two places: one is the SBAs existing in 
Cyprus and the other is the territory the UN Forces existed where a regiments worth 
of British soldiers had been. British army has two tasks in Cyprus 
These soldiers servicing with UNFICYP is on an unaccompanied six-month 
tour of duty as soldiers of the UN and are tasked to accomplish their responsibility on 
maintaining the integrity of the Buffer Zone which runs between Turkish–Cypriots 
and Greek–Cypriots. These UNFICYP soldiers also take command in Nicosia, the 
capital city of the RoC, which is the busiest area to patrol due to its common usage as 
a location for demonstrations and celebrations.113  
Bases and safe havens operate by maintaining an easily protected, territorial 
zone and the owner’s socio-political practice and experience can be replicated and 
propagated into neighboring instability zones from these places.114 
The SBAs provided the human and logistical backbone of the UNFICYP 
whenever the Cyprus government invited. As a guarantor power under the treaties, 
which established the RoC, one would have expected the bases to play a key role 
between Greeks and Turks in 1964, 1967, and in 1974.115 
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They did to a degree in 1964 with the Joint Truce Force, “set up with British 
troops formed as a precursor either to NATO or UN involvement”. In 1974, except 
for dealing with the internally displaced persons who had fled to the SBAs for safety-
especially thousands of Turkish Cypriots from the Limassol and Paphos regions and 
larger number of Greek Cypriots from the Famagusta region-, nothing was done to 
intervene militarily.116 
After 1974 the Cypriot area, except for the British site, which retained its 
rights and made a profit by renting its installations to UNFICYP, became a buffer 
zone under UN jurisdiction. 117 
The bases represented the power and reach of Britain, on local and regional 
display, and this persisted in the first Gulf War, the invasion of Iraq, and indirectly in 
UNFICYP but the bases increasingly became of less importance to Britain 
strategically.118  
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CHAPTER IV 
BRITISH POLICY FROM 1961 TO 1970 
The deep-rooted suspicions in the island against the West existed and were 
strongly reconfirmed by political events during the 1960s and 1970s. The Jupiter 
missile crisis in 1962 and the Cyprus crises of 1964 and 1974 are just some cases, 
which caused suspicions and insecurity with its conspiracy theories that lost 
confidence in the West for the Turkish population. Especially the letter of President 
Johnson to Đsmet Inönü, written in 1964, reconfirmed Turkish suspicions by 
“cautioning Đnönü that if Turkish action on the island would invite a Soviet attack, 
then NATO was not obliged to defend Turkey.”119 Another proof of the insincerity of 
the West was the arms embargo the American government put on Turkey after the 
1974-peace operation in Cyprus.120 
Because Greek–Cypriots resented the 30 percent of the administration being 
in Turkish–Cypriot hands, Greek–Cypriots established their own plan which was 
Akritas Plan to force Turkish–Cypriots into submission to facilitate enosis.121 The 
Akritas Plan was ready for implementation in 1960 and was heading for capturing 
the whole island by force of arms and to expel all Turkish–Cypriots from the 
island.122 Although the international agreements preserved the rights of both 
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communities in the island, 5000 Greeks began their radical activities in 1960-1963 
against Turkish–Cypriots because of their refusal of accepting any changes in the 
Constitution that preserved their rights to some extent.123 The killing of Turkish–
Cypriots increased when arms, troops and tanks came into Cyprus from Greece and 
when Greek warplanes bombed areas that Turkish–Cypriots had lived.124  
The systematic genocide having the main aim of enosis against Turkish–
Cypriots, which was implemented as planned, made Turkish–Cypriots as victims 
after Cyprus gained its independence from Britain although a constitutional republic 
was established in 1960.125 EOKA terror organization massacred so many Turks 
during 1963-1974 and acted openly for enosis.126A massacre had taken place when 
heavily armed Greek–Cypriots surrounded Turkish–Cypriots in their villages in 
Limassol and began to kill and expel them.127 For their life, Turkish–Cypriots were 
driven out of their homes, businesses and farms.128 On 26 December 1963, Turkish–
Cypriots’ bodies in Ayios Vassilios were exhumed from a mass grave after being 
massacred.129 
“It is nonsense to claim, as the Greek–Cypriots do, that all casualties were caused by fighting 
between armed men of both sides. On Christmas Eve many Turkish–Cypriot people were 
brutally attacked and murdered in their suburban homes, including the wife and children of the 
                                                 
123
 Sabahattin Ismail, Kıbrıs’ta Yunan Sorunu (1821–2000) (The Greek Question in Cyprus 1821–
2000), Istanbul: Akdeniz Publications, 2000, p.90-91 
124
 Ibid. 
125
 Background Note: Cyprus, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, December 2004,p.127,  
http://www.er.cna.it/biblioteca/files/200505140135212005051401357337Paesi_Lettera_C_pdf7351.p
df 
126
 Ünal, Hasan, The Cyprus Question and The EU: The Annan Document and Latest Developments, 
Stradigma, E-Journal of Strategy and Analysis, 
http://www.stradigma.com/english/april2003/articles_06.html 
127
 Quoted from, Observer, February 10, 1964, in, Bamanie, Nuray, Cyprus' Forgotten Turks, Journal 
of Muslim Minority Affairs, Vol. 22, No. 2, 2002, p. 446 
128
 Stephen, Michael , How the International Community Made a Cyprus Settlement Impossible, 
Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs, Vol. VI, No. 1, 2001, pp. 4–5. 
129
 Quoted from, Daily Telegraph, January 14, 1964 in, in, Stephen, Michael , How the International 
Community Made a Cyprus Settlement Impossible, Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 
VI, No. 1, 2001, p.1 
  
 
 
35 
Turkish–Cypriot head of army medical services allegedly by a group of forty men, many in 
army boots and great coats.”130  
In 1967-1968, a Turkish–Cypriot provisional administration had to be formed 
following another occurrence of inter-communal violence.  
4.1. The Thirteen Points of Makarios 
In November 30th, 1963, Makarios proposed to his vice president, Fazıl 
Küçük, 13 amendments that would facilitate, according to the aspect of Greek–
Cypriots, the functioning of the state system and the Constitution.131  
The implementation and interpretation of the constitution caused serious 
differences between the two communities. Greek–Cypriots argued that there were 
obstacles to efficient government because of the complex mechanisms introduced to 
protect Turkish–Cypriot interests.132  
Considering the desire of Greeks for enosis, Greek–Cypriots wanted to end 
the separate Turkish–Cypriot municipal councils established during the British 
government in 1958. With Greek–Cypriots’ feeling of disturbance, Greek–Cypriots 
led by Makarios developed a thirteen-point amendment to the present Constitution. 
This thirteen-point proposal was designed, in Makarios’s view, to eliminate 
impediments to the functioning of the government.133 Makarios believed that the 
Constitution of the RoC, written by Greece and Turkey, impeded the development of 
the country and produced difficulties in its smooth functioning. Greek–Cypriots 
argued that there were obstacles to efficient government which were the complex 
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mechanisms protecting Turkish–Cypriots’ interests but not the true interests of the 
Public Service. The Thirteen Points of Makarios were sent to the Prime Ministers of 
Turkey, Greece and Britain on November 29, 1963.134 
The Thirteen Points of Makarios demands the abolishment of the right of veto 
of the President and the Vice-President of Cyprus.135  
The Vice-President of the Republic also will be given the authority to replace 
the President in his temporary absence or incapacity to perform his duties well. The 
case with the Vice-President and President of the House of Representatives is the 
same.136  
The elections are also to be modified. Instead of having Greek Members of 
the House to vote only for the Greek President of the House of Representatives and 
the Turkish Members of the House to vote only for the Turkish Vice-President, they 
will be voted as a whole.137 
Military arrangements are also to be modified. It was demanded that the 
division of the Security Forces into the Police and Gendarmerie should be abolished. 
The number of Security Forces and the Army must be determined by the law and not 
by arrangements made between the President and Vice-President of the Republic. 
The number of Turkish–Cypriot and Greek–Cypriot participants in the Public 
Service and Forces of the Republic must be proportionate with the ratio of the 
population of each community.138 
Within the Public Service Commission, the agreed number of ten members 
must be reduced to five or seven. All the decisions in the Commission will be based 
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on majority vote. If there would be allegations of discrimination on unanimous 
request, the matter would be forwarded to the Supreme Constitutional Court.139 
The Greek Constitutional Chamber would also be abolished, according to the 
Thirteen Points.140  
A reason why Makarios acted without doubt was because Sir Arthur Clark, 
British High Commissioner in Cyprus, supported Makarios’s Thirteen Points. 
Makarios was lead to believing that Britain will continue its amendment based on his 
demands but Makarios thought wrong.141  
4.2. Collapse of the Republic 
In December 21st, 1963, two Turkish–Cypriots were murdered by Greek–
Cypriot policemen in order to force Turkish–Cypriots to accept the 13 constitutional 
amendments. Following these events, Turkish–Cypriots abandoned their places in the 
parliament and the administration. 
Still after Cyprus had gained its independence from Britain, Makarios and 
Greek–Cypriots supposed Hellenism to exist especially in the international relations 
and desired to establish union between Greece and Cyprus.142 By launching terror 
against Turkish–Cypriots they believed they would present a fait accompli143 to the 
UN. 
After the independent rule for Cyprus beginning in 1960, EOKA, as EOKA-
B, was this time directly aimed against the president of the RoC, Makarios for 
enosis.144  
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On 1 March 1964, Makarios sent a top-secret letter to the Greek Prime 
Minister, George Papandreou, for the abolition of the Zurich and London 
Agreements and to get rid of the international agreements knowing that the unilateral 
abrogation of the agreements might possibly have serious repercussions.145 UN sent 
in a peacekeeping force to prevent a recurrence of fighting, to contribute to the return 
to normal condition from violent confrontations.146 It is still in Cyprus. 
The establishment of the Cyprus Republic was primarily grounded on the 
goal of achieving a bi-communal relation between the two communities, but federal 
set-up turned out to be complicated. Greek–Cypriots’ refusal to abandon their 
objective for enosis became a major factor that prevented the Cypriots to arrive at a 
peaceful settlement. Makarios, the elected Greek–Cypriot president, did not 
recognize the constitutional agreement as an ultimate aim. Instead, he treated it as an 
initial move to achieve the union with Greece. As a matter of fact, the Republic was 
established, Makarios declared: “Independence was not the aim and purpose of the 
EOKA struggle... Foreign factors have prevented the achievement of the national 
goal, but this should not be a cause for sorrow...”147 He expressed the same attitude 
when he made a statement to the press: “Union of Cyprus with Greece is an 
aspiration always cherished within the hearts of all Greek–Cypriots. It is impossible 
to put an end to this inspiration by establishing a Republic.”148 Clearly, to Makarios 
and to the rest of Greek–Cypriots, enosis, which turned out to have aggressive 
activities against Turkish–Cypriots, was far from over. 
                                                 
145
 The U.N. and Cyprus - 1964, http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/13_points.htm 
146
 Resolution 186 (1964), Adopted by the Security Council at its 1102th meeting, on 4 March 1964, 
United Nations, http://www.un.int/cyprus/scr186.htm 
147
 The Republic’s Disintegration, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, 
http://www.trncgov.com/history_11.htm 
148
 Quoted from, London Times on Arpil 9, 1963, in, The Cyprus Problem, Turkish Embassy, 
http://www.turkishembassy.org.au/makale/cyprusproblem.htm 
  
 
 
39 
Unfriendliness and acrimony between the two communities also barred 
initiatives for cooperation. Greek–Cypriots continued to regard the Turkish 
community as if they were minorities. Antipathy and resentment rose among them 
when the constitution presented Turkish–Cypriots some larger government posts than 
the size provided by their population. The Greek–Cypriot community asserted that a 
disproportionate number of ministers and legislators were provided to Turkish–
Cypriots and they were distressed as Turkish representatives were allowed to veto 
budgets or legislation and prevent essential government operations from being 
carried out.149 Despite the fact that Turkish–Cypriots were given equal status as co-
founders of the Cyprus Republic, Makarios declares that the duty of the EOKA 
would not cease unless Turkish–Cypriots would have to abandon from Cyprus which 
shows that equal and mutual rights were refused. The political coalition between the 
two communities broke down three years after the Cyprus Republic was established 
and a series of constitutional changes was Greek–Cypriots’ aim. Constitutional 
amendments, which were strongly opposed by Turkish–Cypriots, would reduce the 
political rights and powers of the Turkish Cypriot community. 150 
Turkish–Cypriots asserted that the objective of the amendments to reduce 
their status from co-founder to minority is clear and indicative of the move to alter 
the bi-communal structure of the Republic to a unitary state where Greek–Cypriot 
authority and powers would be dominant. On the other hand, Greek–Cypriots argued 
that the 1960 Constitution and the international treaties were imposed by external 
powers and that these were signed under the unwanted effects of the guarantor 
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powers. Greek–Cypriots therefore insisted on modifying the constitution, which 
would be for only their advantage.151  
The issue on constitutional amendments continuously increased the tension 
between the two communities and an inter-communal violence began in December 
1963. Turkish–Cypriots demanded partition for security while Greek–Cypriots 
wanted a unitary state governed mainly by them for enosis. It was in March 1964 that 
members of the UNFICYP were sent to the island but hostilities were not disarmed 
and ceased until August 1964 when both sides accepted a UN resolution152 calling for 
a cease-fire. The UNFICYP kept peace between the two communities but the 
subsequent UN efforts to restore settlement failed. The government established in 
1960 no longer functioned as Turkish–Cypriots and Greek–Cypriots established their 
respective administrative systems.153  
4.3. The Acheson Plan and British Policy 
There were two main Acheson Plans. According to the first one, Greece 
would make certain concessions to Turkey in return for the union of Cyprus with 
Greece.154 During the 1963 assaults in Cyprus, Britain, with the support of the USA 
submitted a joint proposal on January 31, 1964. According to the proposal, a NATO 
unit of 10 thousand troops, wherein 1,200 American troops were included, will come 
to Cyprus, lead by a British commander and a mediator would be assigned by 
NATO. Makarios rejected this. In July 15 of the same year, the USA, supported by 
Britain, gave another proposal to Cyprus indicating that the Karpaz Peninsula, which 
makes up 5 percent of the total land area of Cyprus, would be handed over to Turkey 
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and in return, Turkey would accept enosis. With this, Cyprus would be then divided 
into 6 local administrations, wherein Turkish–Cypriots would handle 2 
administrations. Turkish Cypriots would have minority rights. Greece, led by 
Makarios, again, did not accept the plan because it did not include enosis 
exclusively. In return, they came up with a plan of their own which they proposed to 
the concerned sides. According to the plan, Turkey would be given 32 square 
kilometers area in Cape El Greco for 25 to 30 years and offered them minority 
rights.155 
The Greek government did not accept the first Acheson Plan, and so a second 
one was submitted.156 Acheson forwarded another plan during August of the same 
year and indicated that the whole island of Cyprus would be given to Greece except 
for that a territory of 200 square miles in the eastern section of the Northern-
Southern line 2 miles west of Komikebir, which would be rented to Turkey for 50 
years. The rest of the island would be given to Greece. Turkish–Cypriots would be 
given minority rights and the officials would deal with Turkish affairs in Nicosia. 
Greece again rejected this plan because of the absence of enosis unconditionally. 
Turkish rights would be guaranteed by USA and the Turkish government would 
accept the Acheson Plan.157 
After British rule had ended in Cyprus, its policy came to a time of revision 
in 1965s. Its SBAs were needed to reach Middle East, Persian Gulf and to support 
CENTO. Britain was also forestalling war between Turkey and Greece. Otherwise, 
Soviet threat might reach the island. Enosis was accepted for its interests but Cyprus 
seemed to have guaranteed its independence by the UN. Britain did not expect an 
increasing problem against itself as UNFICYP might avoid the fighting in the island. 
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Consequently, SBAs would be free for other tasks. UN auspices could arrange for 
talks between the two sides in Cyprus. Anglo-American initiative designed to bring 
about a UNFICYP mandate against the danger of a Turko-Greek war.158 
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CHAPTER V 
BRITISH POLICY FROM 1971 TO 1980 
5.1. Cyprus During Cold War 
The NATO alliance in the Eastern Mediterranean for both Turkey and Greece 
had strengthened the two countries’ military capabilities and consequently allowed 
them focus on regional rivalries rather than the primary Soviet threat.159  
The Cyprus Question has pitted two NATO allies, Turkey and Greece, 
against each other for years because of the peace operation on July 20th, 1974 
responding to a brief Greek–Cypriot coup on July 15th, 1974, engineered by the 
military then ruling Greece.160  
The extension of the Karpaz peninsula, being perceived as a dagger aiming at 
the stomach of Turkey,161 threatens Turkey’s naval maneuverability by offering 
Cyprus the possibility of blocking the exit from Đskenderun gulf being only 40 
nautical miles162 away from Anatolian coasts.163 On the other hand, Cyprus has been 
in more security since 1974, controlling more than one-third of the Mediterranean 
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island in response to the ‘Athens junta-engineered coup against Archbishop 
Makarios’164 led by Greek–Cypriots seeking enosis.165  
Turkey had participated in the 1960 international agreements. Turkey went 
along with them. Turkish action was legal according to the point of view of Standing 
Committee of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. It had 
confirmed Turkish legal action by its statement in 21 March 1979:  
“The Turkish military intervention in Cyprus, which was carried out in accordance with the 
Zurich and London Agreements, was legal. Turkey, as one of the Guarantor powers, had the 
right to fulfill its obligations. The real culprits…are the Greek officers who engineered and 
staged the coup and prepared the conditions for this intervention.”166 
TRNC was established in 1983, for national interests, security and human 
rights of the Turkish-Cypriots. 
5.2. Significance of Cyprus  
Britain initially had refused to withdraw its control over Cyprus to keep it as 
a base in guarding the Suez Canal. Moreover, during the transfer of sovereignty to 
the Cypriot communities, Britain had secured its hold of two bases on the island. The 
British claim of Cyprus therefore was mainly for military security. Western Europe 
would no longer be threatened as before by a split of the NATO’s southeastern flank 
if in case a Turkish–Greek war over Cyprus starts. Cyprus’ reduced geographical and 
political significance to Britain and to the rest of the international community was 
felt with the reluctance of the UN to keep its forces on the island.167  
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Among the major sides in Cyprus, Turkey was likely to benefit most from the 
situation if enosis was considered not to have occurred. Turkey’s location and size 
made its cooperation and support crucial to Western powers. There were outside 
pressures to resolve the Cyprus Question in a way contrary to Turkish rights and 
interests, but strategic importance of Turkey would probably endure. Greece 
controlled its most important capability against Turkey – its ability to block Turkey’s 
membership in the European Union if the Cyprus problem were not settled in a way 
it found satisfactory.168 But Turkey did not veto Greece’s turn back to military flank 
of NATO in October 20th, 1980. Turkey is Greece’s rival in Europe169 and since the 
island’s independence from Britain in 1960; TRNC paid attention towards policies of 
Southern Cyprus.170 
5.3. Political Transformation and British Policy 
The solution found in 1960 was in fact, not the preferred option of either 
Turkish–Cypriots overwhelmingly in favor of separation or taksim for their security, 
or Greek–Cypriots overwhelmingly in favor of enosis, union with Greece.171  
In 1960s, Cyprus became affected with Greece’s internal problems. The local 
politics in Cyprus became a three-way affair- (1) irredentism and the megale idea, 
(2) anti-royalism and (3) military intervention-, in which George Papandreou and his 
Center Union party balanced between the left-wing’s pro-Communist United 
Democratic and the right-wing’s National Radical Union. When the enosis became 
an important issue, together with the time when Papandreou failed to pursue enosis, 
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they resorted to coup in April of 1967 with a group of middle-level army officers 
known as The Colonels. When the king pursued a counter-coup, he was put into 
exile.172 This military regime headed by Colonel Georgios Papadopoulos claimed to 
be anti-communism but three other Greek politics were clearly visible. One of which 
was irredentism and the megale idea, which is aimed at Cyprus; anti-royalist; and 
military intervention in civilian politics, which was evident since the 1909 coup.173  
During these complexities in the island British plan was based on the decision 
that if Turkey invaded Cyprus, SBAs were not expected to be involved in Turkish 
operations. Also it was believed that a possible operation in Cyprus was in fact 
against Greece as 12,000 Greek forces were in Cyprus illegally. On the other hand, 
sides were in NATO. A break-up of the NATO alliance brings the possible reaction 
of the Soviet Union. British policy was more related to the external circumstances 
when internal problems of Cyprus were considered.174 British interests in Cyprus 
were to prevent the instability of the southeastern flank of NATO, to keep Cyprus 
linked to the west, to continue to use the SBAs in Cyprus, and to preserve Turkish 
overflying facilities granted to Britain. Partition of the island could risk the British 
retention of the SBAs. So, an independent republic should be preserved.175 
If the internal circumstances of Cyprus are focused, it can be seen that 
problems were increasing. Upon the economic crisis due mainly to the OPEC oil 
embargo, the Colonel dictatorship finally ended in 1973. Colonel Papadopoulos, a 
former chief of the EOKA terror organization, tried to unrest among Cypriot students 
and in the navy by proclaiming a republic but was soon displaced by the other 
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officers.176 The EOKA terror organization, as well as the official police under full 
control of the Greeks in 1960s, confined Turkish–Cypriots from more than thirty per 
cent to three per cent of the Island. This ethnic cleansing continued for about eleven 
years until 1974.177 
In July of 1974, a group of Cypriot military men comprising of officers from 
Greece, EOKA and the Greeks established a coup against the government of 
Makarios, who was then president of the RoC. However, instead of gaining the 
objected enosis, the coup went wrong, backfired and brought about a crisis, which 
led to Turkish–Cypriots have power over the island. This time, Turkish–Cypriots 
were able to foresee the weakness of the Greeks after a legal peace operation.178 
Accordingly, after the military coup that destroyed the RoC regime in 1974, 
Turkey had to send in 30,000 troops to protect Turkish–Cypriots and maintain 
security for them.179 But this caused some negative results for Turkey.180 
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5.4. Peace Operation 
Public opinion in Turkey “agitated by stories and pictures in the 
press…strongly supported the idea of military intervention to protect the Turks on 
the island.”181  
Ongoing conflict in 1974 divided the island into two de facto autonomous 
entities, TRNC in the North, and Southern Cyprus in the South, but on the contrary, 
Cypriot Government in the south was recognized internationally for the whole 
island.182  
EOKA-B had carried out the coup in 1974 with the encouragement of the 
Greek colonels, and it was still continuing to operate underground and with guerilla 
techniques as if their territory had been legally invaded. Hence, all these illegal 
attitudes and circumstances had brought about the Turkish peace operation, citing the 
1960 Treaty of Guarantee to protect Turkish–Cypriots. These events laid blame on 
EOKA’s wrong method for reaching enosis by making union of Cyprus with Greece 
even more difficult than before.183  
After the Greek coup in Cyprus, the Soviet Union gave the Turkish 
government, which was one of the least militaristic one at the time, clear signs that 
they would not impede if Turkey chose the guarantee duty.184 Britain did not fulfill its 
responsibilities obliged by the Treaty of Guarantee, and therefore Turkey, as a 
Guarantor Power by the 1960 agreements, alone made the peace operation in 1974.185 
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Before action, Turkey had approached Britain with an offer of military 
operation together but Britain avoided doing it. So, Turkey ordered an amphibious 
landing, which succeeded in putting an end to the violence against Turkish–
Cypriots.186 
Greek-inspired coup against President Makarios caused to fighting in 1974. 
At first intra-communally occurring violence among Greek–Cypriots, then had 
involved Turkish–Cypriots and consequently a ‘peace operation (Turkish–Cypriot 
term)’ or ‘an invasion (Greek–Cypriot term)’ occurred.187  
In a two-stage offensive operation including different periods of fighting over 
two months, Turkish troops took control of 38 percent of the island and a ceasefire 
line began existing. Between 40,000 and 50,000 Turkish–Cypriots living in the south 
were sent towards north188 and Greek–Cypriots went south which implied and meant 
the need and necessity of living in different areas. The systematic genocide against 
the Turkish community had continued up to Greek junta regime in 1974.  
After the second peace operation, some had remembered an activity of 
criticizing the ‘wrong’; for example criticized Turkish–Cypriots’ and Turkey’s 
operation for peace in Cyprus in the time when some doubtful short-term calming 
down occurred, but ignored and forgot to criticize violation of Turkish–Cypriot’s 
human rights occurred in the short and long term. There are different perceptions in 
these events. Another one is: 
“The second ‘operation’ carried the ‘operation’…beyond the area of…Turkish settlement; and it 
came after any acute danger to the ‘Turkish–Cypriots’ had passed and democracy in Greece had 
been restored. Hence, it was this second ‘operation’ far more than the first that, immediately and 
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over the years, subjected Ankara to…criticism in Greece and among its friends in Europe, 
America and the world.”189  
Ironically, Makarios declared at the UN on 19 July 1974 that two Greek 
invasion of Cyprus had occurred before. In addition, the decision of Athens Court of 
Appeals dated March 21st, 1979 was that Turkish intervention was legal.190 
Since the events of 1974, UN peacekeeping forces maintained a buffer zone 
between the two sides after the partition in 1974 which was in response to a coup led 
by extremist Greek–Cypriots against the government of President Makarios, ‘citing 
his alleged pro-communist leanings and his perceived abandonment of enosis’.191  
“…there can be no doubt that the responsibility for this barbaric putsch rests with the squalid  
military dictatorship in Greece…It is almost beyond belief that the Greek officers would attempt 
to install as President of Cyprus one Nikos Sampson, confessed murderer, professional bully 
boy and fanatical supporter of enosis…”192  
After the peace operation, the Greek government was blamed by even much 
of its own population for actions that appeared to isolate Greece from every country 
in the world.193  
After 1974, Greek voters refused to return to the traditional politics of the 
1940s and a plebiscite also refused the restoration of the monarchy. Voters, instead, 
focused on the rise of power of the PASOK led by Andreas Papandreou. PASOK 
was a combination of socialist style speaking, populist economic and anti-Turkish 
nationalist advocacies, which were based on elements that had rejected the junta. 
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PASOK was also anti-American because the USA did not support Greece in its 
pursuance of enosis.194 
In February 13th, 1975, the establishment of the Turkish–Cypriot Federal 
State195 was proclaimed and nearly nine years late in November 15th, 1983, the 
independence of the TRNC was proclaimed.196  
5.5. Political Divide 
The strategic significance of Cyprus lies in the fact that its existence 
represents a ‘stationary aircraft carrier’. So, in case of the annexation of Cyprus and 
Greece, a line of Greek islands would encircle Turkey’s coasts. Consequently, the 
change of balance of forces between Greece and Turkey, which signifies a threat 
against either side’s vital interests, had more an importance than humanistic reasons 
of the protection of Turkish–Cypriots and had more a danger and importance than the 
occurring violation of Turkish–Cypriots’ rights.197  
The Security Council called upon Turkey, Greece and Britain to enter into 
negotiations to re-establish a constitutional government in Cyprus. This resolution 
was conducted upon the intervention and peace operation of Turkey in Cyprus.198 The 
Geneva declaration of July 30, 1974 was made in accordance with this resolution. 
With this declaration, Ministers of the three guaranteeing powers explicitly and 
unequivocally recognized the existence of the autonomous administrations of 
Turkish–Cypriots and Greek–Cypriots in the island.199 However, the two 
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administrations could not work together any longer and in August 1975, the 
Voluntary Exchange of Populations Agreement was reached between representatives 
of the two Cypriot populations for the voluntary regrouping of the Cyprus 
communities with the Turkish zone in the north and the Greek zone in the South.200 It 
was a remarkable fact that one day before the UN Resolution 353 of 20 July 1974, 
the then Greek Cypriot leader Makarios had confirmed that it was indeed Greece that 
had invaded the island in 1974. This was declared in his address to the Security 
Council.201 
The two communities have been living separately within their own 
geographical territories. Greek–Cypriot administration, only itself, attempted to 
represent the RoC ignoring the existence of Turkish–Cypriot administration which 
occupied one third of the island. It is recognized internationally and is part of the UN 
General Assembly as a sovereign state.202  
Meanwhile, Turkish–Cypriots declared TRNC. TRNC was proclaimed on 
November 15, 1983 by the unanimous vote of the legislative body of the Turkish 
Federated State of Cyprus. The founding of this independent Turkish Republic is an 
expression and materialization of Turkish–Cypriots’ claim of their right of self-
determination as what Greek–Cypriots claimed.203 Both states in Cyprus maintained 
most of the European institutional practices that Britain had effects before, during its 
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rule on Cyprus. They both have formed separate political systems and exercised free 
elections.204 
The TRNC is highly committed to the UN Charter that promotes democracy, 
respect for human rights and rule of law. It presents a foreign policy whose principle 
of “Peace at Home, Peace in the world”, aims to build a world of peace, law and 
order. Despite being denied with international recognition and representation, TRNC 
continues to play its part in establishing and maintaining strong friendly relations 
with neighboring countries, and in upholding the pillars of mutual respect and non-
interference with other’s affairs.  
The Republic’s founding aim is to find a fair and peaceful solution to the 
Cyprus Question which Turkish–Cypriots believe would form a corner stone of a 
world in peace. Its foreign policy is constantly directed towards achieving a 
settlement in Cyprus. Conversely, there has not been a considerable progress in the 
negotiating process between the TRNC and the Greek side in 1970s.205 
UN Security Council rejected the TRNC declaration stating that it ‘deplores 
the Declaration of the Turkish–Cypriot authorities of the purported secession of the 
part of the RoC; that it ‘considers the Declaration referred to above as legally invalid 
and calls for its withdrawal’; and also ‘calls upon all states not to recognize any 
Cypriot state other than the RoC’206 in Resolution 541. The Security Council again 
asked the Secretary-General to pursue his mission of good offices ‘in order to 
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achieve the earliest possible progress towards a just and lasting settlement in 
Cyprus’.207 
Not one Turkish–Cypriot has been compensated for loss of lives or property, 
but on the other hand, the international community pressured the victims to accept a 
federal system instead of liberty.208 In reality, facing the silence of the international 
system, Turkey had come to the conclusion that operation to protect the security of 
Turkish–Cypriots was a real duty.  
Britain had military forces in the SBAs, which could be used in opposition to 
the Athens junta-engineered coup against Makarios although Britain had signed the 
Treaty of Guarantee that obliged the responsibility to maintain the independence of 
the RoC, territorial integrity, and security. In 1974, the Turkish–Cypriots called upon 
Britain as a Guarantor power under Article 4 of the 1960 Cyprus Treaty, but Britain 
did not fulfill its responsibility. 
Turkish–Cypriots were equal co-founders of the RoC as Greek–Cypriots 
were, but Greek–Cypriots’ continued to operate separately in all international 
relations. Britain ignored this though it signed the Treaty of Establishment.  
In Geneva declaration of 1974, Britain recognized the existence of two 
autonomous administrations209 but did nothing in the UN against Resolution 541.210  
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CHAPTER VI 
BRITISH POLICY FROM 1981 TO PRESENT 
6.1. British Policy 
British Policy towards Cyprus can be analyzed in six main points: 
Britain is against complex institutional arrangements in Cyprus. Turkey, 
Greece, Britain had accepted 1960 Constitution and Britain had wanted to get rid of 
the problems in Cyprus. 211 
Britain is not so much concerned about the percentage of territory that is to be 
given from one side to the other in Cyprus. But if the weight of the political pressure 
from the Greek refugees reduces, there will be comprise over the initial powers of the 
central government in Cyprus. 212 
Britain has two SBAs but also has other retained sites in other parts of the 
island. These are strengthening Britain’s hand in its international relations and they 
have intelligence purposes.213 
The political importance of Britain in the EU increases by its SBAs and 
retained sites in Cyprus, especially when Turkish application to join the EU is 
considered.214 
Having military presence in Cyprus provides Britain to perform its policies 
towards Cyprus, Turkey and Greece more effective. There is no necessity to 
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recognize TRNC since its military presence in Cyprus has legality according to the 
Treaty of Establishment in 1960.215 
The conservation of the British Bases and revision of the failed 1960 Cyprus 
Treaties are the main hidden objectives of the whole Annan Plan negotiations and 
exercises. But in short-term, Britain and USA wish to gain UN sanction for the 1960 
treaties because they are not compatible with the present EU law.216 
6.2. Negotiations under UN Auspices 
Negotiations to achieve new agreements for settlement and to find a 
comprehensive solution to the Cyprus Question were continued under the UN 
auspices despite Greek–Cypriots’ decision to operate separately since 1963. They 
were held between Turkish–Cypriots and Greek–Cypriots. These negotiations about 
the Cyprus question were held between 1968-1974, 1975-1979, 1980-1983, 1988-
1992 and 1999-2004.217 
Through the efforts of UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar, the UN 
from 1980 to 1986 launched a number of initiatives for peaceful settlements. 
Secretary General Perez de Cuellar was fully aware of the complexities and 
difficulties of the extended dispute and was eager to find a satisfactory solution. No 
independent initiative by any other organization or country occurred in this period, 
but deliberations took place over various UN initiatives concerning Cyprus between 
the two Cypriot communities and their main-countries.218  
According to Perez de Cuellar, it was useful to have frequent top-level 
meetings with the leaders of the two Cypriot communities. He considered that inter-
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communal talks between representative Cypriots were the best available method of 
continuing the negotiating process. He also maintained direct contact with the 
foreign ministers of Turkey and Greece, meeting in New York between June and 
October 1982.219 
6.2.1. The Initiative 
A proposal referred to as ‘the Initiative’ was sent to the sides in August 1983. 
This proposal was supposed to have been drafted by the Secretary General himself. 
The Initiative laid down basic proposals. First it suggested the idea of rotating the 
presidency to allow Turkish–Cypriots to vie for the post and head the reunified 
Cypriot State. Second, it proposed to have the legislative as bicameral instead of 
unilateral. The upper chamber was to have an equal number of representatives from 
each community, while the lower chamber would host representatives of the two 
communities in proportion to their population. Each community would vote for its 
own members in the parliament. It also suggested a ratio of 40 percent Turkish–
Cypriots to 60 percent Greek–Cypriots for the executive branch replacing the then 
30-70 distribution indicated in the 1960 Constitution. Moreover, the amount of 
territory to be given back by Turkish–Cypriots would be 8-13 percent. This would 
reduce the existing 37 percent to either 29 or 24 percent. Generally, the Initiative 
implied that Turkish–Cypriots would hand back some territory under their control 
while Greek–Cypriots side would return governmental powers to Turkish–
Cypriots.220 
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6.2.2. Proximity Talks 
The Proximity Talks began in New York on September 10, 1984. They were 
conducted in three rounds and were held under the auspices of the UN with the 
Secretary-General acting as the go-between. The Secretary General met the two 
delegations separately throughout. 221  
The first round of the Proximity Talks began on September 10, 1984 and 
lasted till September 20. Confidence-building measures, the structure of the federal 
government, and territorial adjustments were the three headings of discussions. The 
Secretary General proposed these headings. Also a re-commitment of the two sides 
to the High-Level Agreements of 1977 and 1979 and the points agreed during inter-
communal talks was proposed. He recommended the negotiations to be kept 
confidential. Other topics discussed were the substance of the Cyprus Question and 
the structure of the proposed federal government. Every aspect of the problem was 
considered, but some topics received more the attention of the two parties such as the 
three freedoms of movement, settlement and ownership.222 
The second round of Proximity Talks, beginning on October 15th, 1985, 
lasted for 12 days. Although the agenda, set by the Secretary-General, was meant to 
remain confidential, it was one way or another gone and leaked to the press. 
According to the leak to the press, the agenda included two levels: the points already 
agreed and the points to be agreed by the parties.223  
The points already agreed were:  
“- Acceptance of the 1977 and 1979 High-Level Agreements,  
- And the establishment at the earliest date of the federal republic of Cyprus, to be bi-communal 
in its constitution and ‘multi-regional’ in its territory.  
- It also included acceptance of those constitutional points already agreed in the ‘1981-1983’ 
inter-communal meetings:  
   International representation of the Republic to be the function of the federal government,  
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   Sovereignty to be exercised by the federal government on behalf both federated states and 
their respective territories,  
   And the agreement on single citizenship afforded by the federal government.”224 
Points to be agreed were powers and functions of the central government: 
“- Federal finance,  
- Foreign affairs,  
- International transport,  
- Post and communications,  
- Defense and security,  
- Federal health paper.”225  
Greek–Cypriot side refused to sign it as expected and the summit ended in 
failure.226  
6.2.3. The Draft Framework Agreement 
The Secretary-General had meetings with both Cypriot parties in London and 
Geneva towards the end of 1985 to discuss and agree the points of convergence and 
deal with the points of divergence between the two conflicting sides in Cyprus. He 
presented a new Draft Framework Agreement.227 This agreement was similar in many 
ways to the failed January 1985 summit proposals. It only differed in style on the 
formula equating Turkish–Cypriots’ concession over the amount of territory they 
would part with Greek–Cypriots’ concession over the powers of the central 
government with. The legislature would remain as what was stipulated in January 
1985, except for important matters, which would require separate majorities for each 
community represented in the parliament. A working group was to be to deal with 
and deal with the three freedoms, the freedom of movement, settlement and 
ownership. The withdrawal of foreign troops would also be discussed. The Draft of 
Agreement, however, was rejected by the Greek–Cypriot administration.228 
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The proposals for a comprehensive solution foresaw a bi-communal 
federation between the Turkish and Greek communities, requiring some degree of 
cooperation, power sharing and integration. But the Turkish Cypriots wanted a 
confederation, or at least a state that has territory as one of the two federated states 
and wanted sovereignty on many things within its territory.229 
In 1991 the UN passed a resolution that required and urged the establishment 
of a federal Cyprus state which would consist of two politically equal communities. 
The following year, in 1992, negotiations to resolve the island’s de facto partition 
were initiated. The flow of negotiations during the first half of 1992 appeared 
optimistic towards reaching a settlement acceptable to both Cypriot communities. 
UN Secretary General Boutros Ghali was positive that an agreement was within 
reach. However, meetings between the Cypriot leaders, Denktaş and Vassiliou ended 
without success. The failure of the negotiations was due mainly on the irreconcilable 
and conflicting claim of power and sovereignty of the two communities. The reasons 
are: (1) the degree of sovereignty each component part of the new federal state would 
possess was not agreed, (2) the amount of territory Turkish–Cypriots would hand 
over was not agreed, (3) the conditions the Greek–Cypriot refugees from areas 
remaining under Turkish–Cypriot administration would return was not agreed.230  
6.3. USA–Britain Agreement231 
6.3.1 .The Root of the USA–Britain Agreement 
The initial idea of the agreement was to partition the globe into spheres of 
cryptological influence.232 Ever since the beginning of the Cold War, the USA and 
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Britain have looked forward to placing their intelligence units and equipment in 
Cyprus, which they estimated and considered being the most strategic location for 
this interest. The SBAs in Cyprus, which were set up in the 1960s increased their 
activity and importance till present time. The equipments set in these sovereign bases 
catch and intercept military and diplomatic signals around the Middle East in 
assisting and aiding the USA and British intelligence. 233  
According to the analysis of the Treaty of Establishment of the RoC, 
particularly the setting up of the two sovereign bases in Cyprus in Akrotiri and 
Dhekelia, the freedom of Britain to build their facilities and units for their own 
interests has affected Cyprus until today.234  
The USA’s freedom to use Cyprus as its intelligence area began upon the 
signing of the USA–Britain Agreement but also included other countries like 
Australia, Canada and New Zealand as second parties due to any continuing war with 
Japan. Later on, Turkey, Germany, Norway and Denmark joined as third parties. In 
fact, this agreement had been functioning during the Second World War and outlined 
an international agreement between the USA and Britain. 235  
6.3.2. The Provisions of the USA–Britain Agreement 
According to the USA–Britain Agreement, the five main English–speaking 
countries must take responsibility on checking the activities of the intelligence 
facilities’ surveillance in the different parts of the world.236 The zones which were 
assigned to Britain included Africa and Europe in the eastern part of the Ural 
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Mountains of the Soviet Union. Canada was assigned to the northern latitudes and 
Polar Regions. Australia, on the other hand, covered Oceania. Before obtaining 
knowledge on the arrangements of the members of the USA–Britain Agreement and 
before how the facilities would be handled, there were certain international rules and 
regulations that must be followed by the participants which are, mainly, secrecy, 
signal intelligence, indoctrination and information limiting in indoctrination. (1) 
Lifelong commitment to the secrecy, required by military and political attempts. (2) 
The participating country must be indoctrinated. (3) This indoctrination limits the 
information to only the things they need to know.237 
6.3.3. Implications of the USA–Britain Agreement 
During the 1950s, after the signing of the agreement, Cyprus became a major 
USA launching pad in their intervention into the Arab countries. It has been 
incorporated to the USA worldwide inspection and surveillance networks to 
forewarn them of military activities in the region. USA’s military involvement in 
countries such as Lebanon and Jordan has been aided by USA facilities in the British 
bases in Cyprus. 238   
During the Cold War, Cyprus became a key part in the NATO security 
mechanism against the Soviet Union. During this time, the USA also secured rights 
from Britain to launch U-2 spy planes to monitor Soviet Union’s military activities 
and developments. 239   
Facilities such as automated spy post were installed in TRNC by the United 
States National Security Agency, which were restarted after the Turkish peace 
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operation in 1974. For a long time, it was not known to have restarted but the Cypriot 
government did not argue against it anymore.240  
6.4. September 11 Terrorism  
Not including rare demonstrations or occasional events between soldiers in 
the buffer zone, Cyprus was free of aggressive conflicts from 1974 till 1996, when 
two demonstrators died following illegal activities and tension escalated. It can be 
accepted as quiet since 1996.241 
After the Cold War, the intelligence units in Cyprus receded and came out of 
the international scene. However, after the September 11 terrorist attacks in 
Washington and New York, USA’s war on terrorism was declared and began to 
operate. The USA worked closely with Cyprus in the war on terrorism. With this, 
Cyprus’ role as the intelligence area of the USA and Britain in the Mediterranean 
reappeared. With the USA troops gathering around Iraq, Bahrain, Central Asia and 
Djibouti, the value of Cyprus in the military activities of the USA increased 
dramatically. Cyprus became a key base in such activities as the USA occupation in 
Iraq, the conflict in Palestine, increasing USA pressure in Syria, USA’s concerns on 
their oil supply, other USA’s economic interests, and NATO’s expansion in the East 
and terrorist attacks in Turkey.242 
Some USA facilities were set up in Nicosia, which are used for tactical 
intelligence, monitoring Arab radio broadcasts, which will then be transcribed and 
translated for the use of the USA. They also maintained sophisticated and high 
technology equipment on the top of Mountain Troodos, which is the highest point in 
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Cyprus, to be able to survey the airwaves across Middle East, the Caucasus and 
Central Asia. This USA–British equipment scans radio waves, electronic waves, 
intercepting military, diplomatic and commercial signals through their huge dishes 
and antennas. In consequence, Cyprus was one of the important electronic ears for 
the whole of the Mediterranean.243  
The USA was planning to send in a military force to Cyprus as a 
peacekeeping force. This had already been proposed to Turkish–Cypriots pointing 
out the importance of the island in USA’s geopolitical interests. Cyprus would then 
become an international mandate country serving the USA and Britain mainly 
facilitating their interventions in the Middle East and controlling their oil sources.244 
The USA expects the reunification of Cyprus to gain opportunities to expand 
and install permanent military presence in Cyprus in addition to their well-
established intelligence facilities, and so, the facilities would be upgraded into a full-
fledged army base.245 The biggest intelligence presence on the island is of the USA.246  
The Cypriots suspected that the aim of the USA was in fact, to provide the 
reunification of Cyprus by some activities such as political and financial help for the 
solution. Consequently both sides insisted on their people and urged them even to 
reject the reunification plan of the UN.247 
On the other hand, as a result of the actions made by the USA government of 
redeploying its military troops from Germany to its bases in the Mediterranean; the 
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states in the region became fearful of the fact that Cyprus might become a USA-
Britain protectorate.248 
The USA uses an intelligence-sharing agreement with Britain and a listening 
post in the TRNC in the war against terrorism.249 A listening post in TRNC and an 
intelligence-sharing agreement with Britain and the Turkish-occupied north of the 
island are being used by the USA in the war against terrorism. Also NATO tries for 
access to the Geçitkale airport in the TRNC.250  
The intelligence-sharing agreement of the UK-USA, the listening post in the 
Turkish-occupied north of the island, the island’s role as the intelligence area of the 
UK-USA are the facts being used by the UK-USA in the war against terrorism. 
6.5. Cyprus and the European Union 
In September 12th, 1963, Association Agreement was signed between Turkey 
and the EU in Ankara and it came into force in December 1, 1964. 
Association Agreement between the Greek Cypriots and the EC was signed in 
December 19, 1972 and came into force in June 1, 1973. In May 1, 2004, Cyprus 
entered the European Union as a divided island.251  
Only Britain and Greece were not only recently became concerned with the 
Cyprus Question; most other EU members were newly concerned through the EU 
enlargement.252  
Ankara has stated repeatedly that it neither wants the EU to have an active 
role in the negotiations for settlement or become involved in the Cyprus question. 
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Greece was a member of the EU, thus Turkey was sure that the Union would not be 
impartial.253 On the other hand Britain, the former colonial power, and the USA 
concurred with Annan’s plan and a sudden accession of Cyprus to the European 
Union.254 But, Greek Cypriots has, from time to time, threatened to veto Turkey’s 
candidacy.255 
Initially, the Greek–Cypriot government claimed recognition as the lawful 
RoC and has been treated in this way since 1964 leaving Turkish–Cypriots excluded 
from all diplomatic relations.256 Greek–Cypriots claim that Turkish–Cypriots 
deliberately abstain from their duties in the government since 1963 and all UN states, 
excluding Turkey, accept Greek government as the government of both sides in 
Cyprus. But in contrast, Greek government refused Turkish–Cypriots’ request to 
return to the House of Representatives in 1965. In addition Greek–Cypriots wanted 
serious limitations of their power to be represented in the government.257 Such 
discriminatory treatment against Turkish–Cypriots and not recognizing TRNC was of 
the Commonwealth among the international institutions. It has every time excluded 
Turkish–Cypriots from contact with its Secretary-General, and from all its meetings, 
but Greek–Cypriots were the ones to rule and govern its measures and proceedings 
on Cyprus.258 With this system, the crisis of confidence continued to affect and 
disturb the two Cypriot communities and diplomatic initiatives were less expected to 
success. The situation got worse after Greek–Cypriots made an illegitimate unilateral 
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application for membership of the European Union (EU) in 1990, 9 years after 
Greece joined the EU.259  
While Greek–Cypriots were applying for membership of the EU, the UN 
Security Council had adopted Resolution 649 in March 12, 1990. The resolution 
called upon Turkish–Cypriots and Greek–Cypriots to reach an acceptable solution in 
the form of a bi-communal, bi-zonal260 federation.261 According to the UN Secretary 
General: 
Cyprus is the common home of the Turkish–Cypriots and of the Greek–Cypriots. Their 
relationship is not one of majority and minority but one of two communities in the State of 
Cyprus. The mandate given to me by the Security Council makes it clear that my mission of 
good offices is with these two communities. My mandate is also explicit that the participation of 
the two communities in this process is on an equal footing. The solution that is being sought is 
thus one that must be decided upon by, and, must be acceptable to both communities. It must 
also respect the cultural, religious, social and linguistic identity of each community.262  
The Greek–Cypriot’s application for membership to the EU has (1) 
constitutional illegitimacy and (2) international illegitimacy because the Greek 
Cypriots were definitely committed to not participating in any total or partial 
political or economic union with any State according to the Treaty of Guarantee.263 
By trying to push through its application for membership on July 4, 1990- even 
though the pending Security Council resolution- the Greek–Cypriot administration 
clearly and obviously disregarded and marred prospects to advance negotiated 
settlements. Moreover, its application was made on behalf of RoC as whole of the 
island, excluding Turkish–Cypriots from government since 1963. Turkish–Cypriots, 
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being even not consulted for the access to the EU, were confronted with an 
illegitimate action as if they had no legal right to claim sovereignty in Cyprus. But on 
the other hand, under the 1960 International Agreements, sovereignty was vested in 
Turkish–Cypriots and Greek–Cypriots jointly. So, such a basic step as application to 
the EU could not be taken without the authority of the elected leaders of both TRNC 
in the North, and Southern Cyprus in the South whose population were equal co-
founders of the RoC. The same thing was stipulated in the Geneva declaration of 
1974: Turkey, Greece and Britain recognized the existence of two autonomous 
administrations. Greek–Cypriots were therefore aware of the unconstitutionality of 
their illegitimate action but in spite of this, deliberately did they decide to close their 
eyes to that fact.264  
Apart from the constitutional illegitimacy, international illegitimacy was 
another defect of the Greek–Cypriot’s unilateral application for membership to the 
EU because it was a direct violation of the international treaties negotiated by and 
agreed upon by Turkey, Greece and Britain and by both Turkish–Cypriots and 
Greek–Cypriots.265  
Britain and Greece are expressly violating the Treaty of Guarantee obligation 
responding them by promoting directly the union of the Greek–Cypriot 
administration with the EU. Consequently, they are also partitioning the island, 
because Turkish–Cypriots were ignored since they were not in the context of the 
unilateral application of the Greek–Cypriot community nor the treatment of this 
application by the instances of the EU. Moreover, because Turkey is not a member of 
the EU, a right of final veto for Turkish–Cypriots arises in the context of the 
unilateral Greek–Cypriot application for membership in the EU and the Turkish–
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Cypriot opposition to this application is of a basic fact.266 Hence, there was an 
application but its authority had an internationally unlawful character, because in 
fact, it didn’t have the legal capacity to apply. Consequently the application by this 
method made itself null and void. On the other hand, from a point of view of 
international law; the acceptance of this unilateral application by the EU, and the EU 
decision taken in Luxembourg to start negotiating with Greek–Cypriots, and 
therefore the negotiations taking place forward were, similarly, null and void as 
well.267  
During the proceedings, the international environment ignored to recognize 
the equal status of Turkish–Cypriots as co-founders of the RoC. This is parallel to 
and thus helps the Greek–Cypriot intention to achieve monopoly of political power 
and reduce Turkish–Cypriots to minority status.268 But the Report of the Secretary 
General to the Security Council, S/24472 dated 21st August 1992269 clearly declared 
the fact that there was no longer a single RoC but bi-zonal, bi-communal 
circumstances.270 Also, in 1997, Turkey threatened to attack Cyprus over its decision 
to purchase S-300 Russian air defense missiles and implied that it might annex 
northern Cyprus if the Greek-Cypriot government joined the EU ignoring the co-
founder Turkish-Cypriots.271 On the other hand, on 20 July 1997, Turkey and TRNC 
agreed on a partial integration of the TRNC into Turkey with the fact that Turkey 
was to take over the responsibility for the foreign and defence policy of the TRNC. 
Consequently, Turkish–Cypriots passed two for the TRNC to coordinate its defense 
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and foreign policy with that of Turkey and to have additional autonomy and political 
equality as Greek–Cypriots had272. Britain, as a guarantor power in Cyprus, ignored 
equal status of Turkish–Cypriots as co-founders of the RoC. 
European Council in Luxembourg officially invited Cyprus to join in 
December 1997 and Turkish-Cypriots were invited to participate in the Cypriot 
delegation in the spring of 1998. Greek–Cypriots’ access to EU, despite its obvious 
illegitimacy, limited and declined further efforts to reach at an equally adequate and 
mutually acceptable solution for the Cyprus Question.273 Hence, UN efforts aimed at 
reunifying Cyprus continued with little progress.  
The Greek Cypriots were faster towards the entrance of the European Union 
than even the European countries, and were preparing to become, additionally, a full 
member of the organization. Negotiations for accession began on March 30, 1998. 274 
In December 1999, Helsinki European Council meeting, it was stated that, the 
Cyprus Question being not yet solved, would not block Cyprus’ accession to the 
EU.275 
The European Union, then, remained definite and decisive of achieving a 
united Cyprus. Accession of the TRNC was almost not being considered. But if the 
TRNC’s claim and right for recognition of the state quality of the applicant republic 
is upheld and accepted, in that case an agreement must cover either the formation of 
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a state of “Cyprus” composed of both communities which are TRNC And Southern 
Cyprus. As a result, an isolated accession of the Southern Cyprus was considered.276 
Formal accession of Southern Cyprus as the RoC was in May 2004. When 
Cyprus entered the EU in May 1, 2004, the TRNC was excluded. But international 
recognition may now stand as Azerbaijan has done.277 
In April 2005, new efforts for the reunification of Cyprus moved closer to 
reality in twin referendums as Turkish–Cypriots’ votes approved it, but the Greek 
counterparts rejected it.278 
Preliminary talks had begun at the UN aimed at refreshing a plan to reunite 
Cyprus that was not accepted in 2004 when Greek–Cypriots rejected it and then 
joined the EU as the whole island.279 The new talks were expected to be based on 
2004’s UN plan, which required a loosely federated state with Turks and Greeks that 
maintained autonomous powers over domestic affairs.280 But before these, the 
European Union had formally wanted Turkey to recognize Cyprus.281 
                                                 
276
 The Annan Plan: A Model of Governance in Multiethnic Society (September 11, 2004), Fifth Pan-
European International Relations Conference,  
http://www.sgir.org/conference2004/papers/Sozen%20-%20The%20Annan%20plan.pdf 
277
 Azerbaijan Hints at Recognition of Northern Cyprus, Financial Mirror,  
http://www.financialmirror.com/more_news.php?id=1833 
278
 New York Times, March 29, 2005, from, Online Databases, Bilkent University Library, Full Text 
Databases, from, 
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdlink?did=813675901&sid=5&Fmt=3&clientId=41533&RQT=309&VNa
me=PQD  
279
 Ibid., May 17, 2005 
280
 Ibid. 
281
 New York Times, Dec 18, 2004, from, Online Databases, Bilkent University Library, Full Text 
Databases, from, 
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdlink?did=768062421&sid=5&Fmt=3&clientId=41533&RQT=309&VNa
me=PQD 
  
 
 
72 
6.6. Cyprus, UN and the Annan Plan 
In 2002, the communities were presented with an agreement known as the 
Annan Plan. It is actually a mixture of confederation and federation.282 Main aspects 
of the long and not accepted Annan plan proposed different solution methods for the 
Cyprus Question save conflicting interests of all sides. Some parts are mentioned: 
The Treaty of Guarantee and the Treaty of Alliance would remain in force 
with necessary revisions.283 The new state would the United Cyprus Republic 
modeled on the status of Switzerland.284 Cyprus is a member of the UN and has a 
single international legal personality and sovereignty.285 The executive power of the 
United Republic would be vested to the Presidential Council composed of at least 
one third coming from a constituent state. Foreign Affairs and European Union 
Affairs would not come from the same constituent state.286 The two chambers that 
comprise the federal Parliament would exercise the legislative power287 as a bi-
cameral Parliament whose decisions require the approval of both Chambers by 
simple majority.288 Both sides would have their own courts but the Supreme Court 
would be the judiciary power of the federal state. 289 Under the updated Treaty of 
Alliance, Turkish and Greek contingents would station in the Turkish and Greek 
states respectively.290  A Monitoring Committee chaired by the UN would be 
composed of representatives of the guarantor powers, and Cyprus would be nearly 
demilitarized. Both constituent states would have a fixed territory with clearly 
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defined boundaries.291  Power sharing approach of the Annan plan would be based on 
the representation and the protection of rights of the sides. Integrative power aspect 
would be based on interethnic cooperation and coalitions in multi-ethnic state.292  
Cyprus would be referred to as the United Cyprus Republic.293 
It is remarkable that only the Greek–Cypriot Government holds the island’s 
UN seat, but in fact, the federal government in Cyprus does not have superiority over 
the constituent states.294  
A confederation of two largely independent states was the objective of 
Turkish–Cypriots but a two-zone federation linked by a central government was 
more beneficial for Greek–Cypriots interests as ruling more in Cyprus.295 The new 
UN plan for reuniting Cyprus in 2002 was a federal system with a weak central 
government.296 As Greek Cypriots have always wanted, the draft constitution in the 
Plan put the Greek Cypriots in charge and equal partnership common state is 
disregarded. Central federal institutions have not much importance since important 
legislation would anyway lie with the European Union. But, federal institutions 
include control of external relations, such as with the EU, and immigration, etc. 
which are important for all the citizens of Cyprus. 297  
6.7. Societies in Cyprus and British Policy 
According to a point of view, ‘nation state’ strongly suggests the idea that a 
nation has a right to possess its own state. It was from this concept that the principle 
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of self-determination, the right of a group of people to determine its own form of 
government and decide on the legal and political status of the territory it occupies 
appeared. The international community decided to approach the dilemma by 
redefining self-determination as the right of people to participate in the democratic 
governance of the state in which it exists such as the Turkish–Cypriots’ 
circumstances.298  
For a solution, a jointly accepted system of law is crucial. So, as a solution 
method for the Cyprus Question, it can be said as a beginning that both parties 
should loosen up their inflexible and decisive stance in which they are illegal 
according to a jointly accepted system of law; if they want to secure a peaceful, 
agreeable and equal resolution of the crisis.  
Cyprus’ strategic location is important, as it is beneficial to the major nations’ 
competitive and defensive advantage. But in iternational relations, subjects of the 
system cannot ignore its environment if it exists. The existence of the living subjects-
such as TRNC- cannot be ignored forever. Only approaches may differ for some 
interests.  
The more Turkish–Cypriots and Greek–Cypriots continue to adhere to their 
respective “motherlands”, the longer the separatist ideology and bi-communal, bi-
zonal approach will prevail between them. But the more one side’s motherland is 
concerned with the Cyprus Question, balance of power in the region affects other 
parts and larger unions of the international system as EU and UN are involved in the 
island. Minority differentiations in a small territory or state of affairs may sometimes 
play an important role in the major acts. The most important international 
organizations such as EU and UN continue to be involved with the Cyprus Question. 
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Britain, as a former colonial power in Cyprus continues its policy towards Cyprus in 
the UN and US with the aim of not losing its military sovereignty over the Island in 
any solution appropriate for the other states related to the question.  
Bilateral agreement in Cyprus may be possible but as long as the sides put 
their own interests over the benefit of the island and the region a whole, mutual 
respect for equal sovereignty will be difficult to achieve. Consequently, both parties 
will find ways to secure better benefits than the other.  
According to Mr. Denktaş: 
“I see Palestine, I see Kosovo and I say, ‘Not again.’ You can’t create one nation out of two. 
You can allow them to begin living together by treating them as equals, allowing trust to grow 
between them and allowing them to create an atmosphere where they won’t forget, but they 
won’t emphasize, that they are two peoples on the same land.”299  
If we concentrate on the current situation, we can see some 35,000 troops 
from Turkey are stationed in TRNC, but under the UN plan, the number would have 
gradually dropped to 600, which was the size of the time 1960, the independence 
from Britain.300 Also Bakü-Ceyhan pipeline increases the strategic importance of 
Cyprus and the security of the region and people.301 Controlling Cyprus has the 
strategic option of blocking access to Turkish ports; hence Turkey will insist on 
keeping troops on the island as well as the security of Turkish–Cypriots’ security.302 
On the other hand, Turkey agreed to recognize the RoC as an EU member but did not 
extend full diplomatic recognition to the RoC and declared that full recognition can 
come only when the island is reunified under a mutually acceptable agreement.303  
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Not only Turkey pays attention to the island’s position. For instance the 
British moved to Cyprus after the loss of their military bases in Suez to Egypt and 
stored nuclear bombs on Cyprus.304 British policy towards Cyprus seems that the 
island will have an importance as a stepping stone for its policy towards the region. 
Different solution methods may continue to be focused on, but some points of 
view should not be forgotten for a compatible resolution. The facts that Turkish–
Cypriots: 
– ‘Never rebelled against the Cypriot State’, 
– ‘were perfectly satisfied with the Constitution of 1960’,305 
– were co-founders of the RoC, 
– did not have their own so-called Turkish-enosis to join their own 
motherland,  
– did not have a motherland being a member of an international union as EU, 
though having the neighbor’s not being a member of,  
– did not have their own so-called political and military efforts to achieve 
Turkish-enosis, 
– did not have aggressive and violent group of people as the military arm of 
the so-called Turkish “great idea” (megale idea) aiming at recreating an Empire.  
– did not have a so-called Turkish-EOKA subversive organization, 
– did not have their own so-called underground Turkish-enosis which 
attacked the administration, which conducted terrorist attacks against the 
administration and eventually sowed terror all over the island against their neighbors 
proclaiming that their sole ultimate objective was to invade the island of Cyprus to 
their motherland,  
                                                 
304
 Athanasiadis, Iason, US Seeks Major Military Base on United Cyprus, Asia Times Online, (10 
April 2004), http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/FD10Ak04.html 
305
 Oberling, Pierre, The Cyprus Tragedy, Published by K.Rustem&Brother, 1989, p.44 
  
 
 
77 
should not be ignored when Cyprus Question is considered.  
Finally, absolute peace in all aspects in Cyprus seems to be faraway or 
nonexistent to happen in short-term, but Cyprus’ importance for Britain continues 
with little changes. Main themes of British policy on Cyprus have not changed 
radically. But it sometimes showed little differences. It is not expected to change 
radically in the near future.  
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CHAPTER VII  
CONCLUSION 
British policy towards Cyprus is mainly for military aspects. Cyprus has an 
importance for Britain, as it is the only case where Britain had base areas under its 
own legal authority after its decolonization process. 306 The bases represented the 
power and reach of Britain, on local and regional affairs, and this persisted in the first 
Gulf War, the invasion of Iraq, and indirectly in UNFICYP. 307 
British policy towards Cyprus in 1965s was revised. Its SBAs were needed to 
reach Middle East, Persian Gulf and to support CENTO. Britain was also forestalling 
war between Turkey and Greece. Otherwise, Soviet threat might reach the island. 
Enosis was accepted for its interests but its activity was the ignorance of the internal 
problems of Cyprus. British policy expected that UNFICYP would avoid the fighting 
in the island. Consequently, SBAs would be free for other tasks. 308 
British Policy towards Cyprus after 1980 to present can be analyzed as: 
Britain is against complex institutional arrangements in Cyprus and had 
wanted to get rid of some unnecessary responsibilities by the 1960 treaties. 309 
Britain is less concerned about the exchange of territory in Cyprus but has its 
attention in providing additional rights from the central government in Cyprus. 310 
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Britain has two SBAs but also has other retained sites in other parts of the 
island. These are strengthening Britain’s hand in its international relations also by 
their intelligence purposes. 311 
The political importance of Britain in the EU increases by its SBAs and 
retained sites in Cyprus, especially when Turkish application to join the EU is 
considered. 312 
Having military presence in Cyprus provides Britain to perform its policies 
towards Cyprus, Turkey and Greece more effective. There is no necessity to 
recognize TRNC since its military presence in Cyprus has legality according to the 
Treaty of Establishment in 1960. 313 
To conserve the British Bases and to revise the failed 1960 Cyprus Treaties 
are the main hidden objectives of the existence of the Annan Plan. But in short-term, 
Britain and USA wish to gain UN sanction for the 1960 treaties because they are not 
compatible with the present EU law. 314 
Britain uses an intelligence-sharing agreement with the USA in the war 
against terrorism. 315 
The most important international organizations such as EU and UN continue 
to be involved with the Cyprus Question. Britain, as a former colonial power in 
Cyprus continues its policy towards Cyprus in the UN and EU with the aim of not 
losing its military sovereignty over any solution appropriate for the other states. 
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